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¥" T "Te rely on data from India and the United States to show that political and economic centralization 1 / 1 / can influence the number of national parties in single-member simple-plurality electoral systems. V V Historically, in both countries the number of parties in local electoral districts has been near two, but the number of national parties has fluctuated. Periods of a small number of national parties in both countries correspond to periods of centralization. We argue that, as national governments centralize power and make policies that affect local areas, candidates have greater incentives to associate with national organizations, and voters have greater incentives to abandon locally competitive but nationally noncompetitive parties. P rominent explanations for differences in the number of political parties across countries, most notably Duverger's Law and the literature related to it, have focused on the role of electoral systems. Differences in district magnitude, electoral formulas, the number of run-offs, and presidentialism have each been hypothesized as determining the number of parties (Cox ). Ethnic heterogeneity has also been associated with multiple party systems.' In accounting for changes in the number of national parties over time within individual countries, however, explanations based solely on electoral systems or population diversity are strained. These features rarely change much within countries, and certainly not as often as party systems undergo change in some countries, such as Italy, India, Mexico, or even, as we shall show, the United States. We examine party system change in India and the United States. Both countries are federal (with relatively strong state governments), and both have singlemember, simple-plurality electoral systems. Yet, in both countries the number of parties has varied over

This paper examines the relationship between the levels of debt in the capital structure and performance for a sample of Indian firms. Existing theory posits a positive relationship; however, analysis of the data reveals the relationship for Indian firms to be significantly negative. The structure of capital markets in India, where both short-term and long-term lending institutions are government-owned, is hypothesized to account for the finding of this relationship, and it asserted that corporate governance mechanisms which work in the West will not work in the Indian context unless the supply of loan capital is privatized.

Women in India do not participate in political life to the same extent as men. While a fair number of women turn out to vote they have little representation in legislative bodies at the national and state level. This paper attributes the limited presence of women in legislative bodies to the fact that many women are still confined to the household. Evidence to support this claim comes from an analysis of a survey that was conducted in a state of Northern India to assess which women have been able to take the opportunity to join local bodies where, one-third of all seats, are now reserved for women. The analysis suggests that even after controlling for demographic factors, only those women who have an identity that is independent of the household are likely to avail the opportunity to contest elections for local bodies. The paper then extends the findings from the Indian case to other nations by analyzing the World Values Survey and finds that similar patterns exist globally. It is women who have an identity outside the household who are more likely to be politically active.

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