Federalism and Multilevel Governance in Tobacco Policy: the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Devolved UK Institutions

Abstract

Most studies of tobacco control policy focus on the central level of national governments. Yet within the European Union, three levels of government have responsibilities for tobacco control: the EU; the central governments of member states; and provinces or devolved levels of government. This article examines the role of each in the formation of tobacco policy in the United Kingdom. It compares the theory of regulatory federalism with multilevel governance as explanations for tobacco regulatory policy within the EU. While executive-legislative fusion in the United Kingdom leads to the practice of discretionary federalism, the EU provides mixed support for the theory of regulatory federalism. There is significant policy innovation in the UK and its devolved territories as well as limited policy authority for tobacco control in the EU. Overall, multi-level governance (MLG) may be a superior, albeit incomplete, explanation of tobacco control within the EU and the UK.

Multi-level Governance in a Canadian Setting: The Reform of the Detroit River Border Crossing

“…As in other national settings, it examines the reasons for the establishment of a federal system, the interactions of governments and other actors within the federal system, as well as the consequences of the existence of a federal system (Simeon, 2006;Bakvis and Skogstad, 2008;Bakvis et al, 2009;Stevenson, 2009). A common thread within this literature is the importance of the interaction between the two levels of government that have jurisdiction over the same political space, as well as the formal codification of this jurisdiction within the state's constitutional documents (see Asare et al, 2009;Bakvis et al, 2009: 7). In the Canadian context, the two levels of government are the federal and the provincial governments.…”

Multi-level Governance: Conceptual challenges and case studies from Australia

“…This has been noticeable in federal jurisdictions within the EU, such as Germany, as well as countries that have undergone devolution, such as the United Kingdom (e.g. Börzel and Hölsi 2003;Asare et al 2009;Schmidt 1999;Benz and Zimmer 2010;Entwistle et al 2012;Piattoni 2012 the sort of multi-centred collaboration that is now being contemplated, and that could involve federal, provincial, municipal, Aboriginal, and foreign governments, as well as transnational institutions, will be much more complex and increasingly political than earlier federal-provincial interactions.…”

Problem Identification and Agenda Setting

“…There is anecdotal evidence from Canada and Australia that provinces or territories controlled by the left are more likely to adopt tobacco control measures, although the relationship is not very strong (Studlar, 2007a). In the United Kingdom, conservative governments opposed tobacco control regulation between 1979 and 1997, while subsequent Labour governments introduced a range of measures which resulted in the United Kingdom becoming Europe's tobacco control leader (Asare, Cairney, & Studlar, 2009). In the United States, associations are found between Republican dominance at state level and lower cigarette taxes (Morley & Pratte, 2013), and between a legislator's being Republican and his or her intention to vote against tobacco taxes (Flynn et al, 1998).…”