Federalism, multi-level elections and social policy in Brazil and India

Tillin, Louise; Pereira, Anthony W.

doi:10.1080/14662043.2017.1327928

Cited by 20 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Furthermore, by seeking to replace in-kind subsidy payments with "direct benefit transfers" in the disbursement of these schemes on the ground, the BJP government not only aims to avoid "leakage" in their implementation, but also enhances the ability of the center to take full credit for such schemes; thus, strengthening its centralizing narrative. 86 Finally, in convening a meeting of the Inter-State Council in July 2016, Modi, for the first time in a decade, reactivated what constitutionally is envisaged as India's seminal apex intergovernmental body. 87 The meeting brought together the Prime Minister, key union ministers and all state chief ministers to discuss key findings of a Commission on the Reform of Center-State Relations which reported as long back as 2010.…”

Section: Center-state Relations and Intergovernmental Relations: The mentioning

confidence: 99%

Modi-fying Indian Federalism? Center-State Relations Under Modi's Tenure as Prime Minister

Sharma¹,

Swenden²

2018

INPP

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2 of counterinsurgency, in Nagaland and Kashmir, he asserts that ideological penetration of the "politics of conflict resolution" has profoundly affected counterinsurgency operations in both theaters. Where ideological penetration is high, the state has evinced a willingness to accept the logic of ballots; where it is weak, the logic of ballots has been made subservient to the logic of bullets. AbstractFor the first time since 1984, the 2014 general elections handed a majority in the Lok Sabha to a single party. This article provides a critical assessment of what the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party has meant for the dynamics of center-state relations in India. In doing so, the article first engages with the concept of "competitive-cooperative federalism" and more widely with a framework that allows us to locate shifts in center-state relations across three dimensions: the political, the fiscal, and the administrative. Overall, we argue that despite the BJP's promise to put "center-state relations on an even keel" these relations have become more centralized under the Prime Ministership of Narendra Modi. At the same time, this process of centralization has not been uniform across the three identified dimensions: centralization is strongest in the political domain, but weakest in fiscal matters, where the central government felt bound by the recommendations of the XIV Finance Commission and by longstanding intergovernmental discussions on overhauling India's complex indirect taxation system with a polity-wide Goods and Services Tax, the management of which relies on center-state consent.

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Section: Center-state Relations and Intergovernmental Relations: The mentioning

confidence: 99%

Modi-fying Indian Federalism? Center-State Relations Under Modi's Tenure as Prime Minister

Sharma¹,

Swenden²

2018

INPP

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“…Furthermore, even where the central government initiates programmes, or predominantly funds them, state governments—or panchayats in the case of a policy like MGNREGA—may be the primary administrative tier responsible for service delivery. In the past, this has allowed state governments to steal the credit for policies initiated and primarily funded by the central government (Tillin & Pereira, 2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

The BJP’s Welfare Schemes: Did They Make a Difference in the 2019 Elections?

Deshpande

Tillin

Kailash

2019

Studies in Indian Politics

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In this article, we use data from the 2019 NES post-poll survey to assess the impact of BJP’s welfare schemes on voting behaviour. We demonstrate that compared to earlier elections, voters are more likely to give credit to the central government as opposed to state governments or local politicians for welfare schemes. This centralization is especially the case for some of the BJP’s new welfare programmes such as Ujjwala and the Jan Dhan Yojana. However, even earlier Congress-era schemes such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and the Awas Yojana are now more associated with the central government. Schemes such as the Public Distribution System (PDS) and Old Age Pensions are still more likely to be associated with state governments. At the all-India level, we find some evidence that voters who received benefits under Ujjwala, Jan Dhan Yojana or Awas Yojana schemes were more likely to vote for the BJP, whereas recipients of pensions or MGNREGA were less likely to support the BJP.

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“…While bureaucratic resources improve implementation, attributing this improvement to the actions of particular politicians and parties is difficult for voters, especially because implementation is a noisy function of bureaucratic capacity as well as many other factors. 4 It is especially difficult for voters to assign credit for improvements in bureaucratic resources and implementation to the responsible party in contexts of multi-level government combined with decentralization of authority (Bueno 2018;León 2011;Powell 2000;Tillin and Pereira 2017), where rival parties and politicians may compete for the credit or shift blame (divided agency).…”

Section: Overloaded Bureaucratsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India

Dasgupta

Kapur

2020

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Government programs often fail on the ground because of poor implementation by local bureaucrats. Prominent explanations for poor implementation emphasize bureaucratic rent-seeking and capture. This article documents a different pathology that we term bureaucratic overload: local bureaucrats are often heavily under-resourced relative to their responsibilities. We advance a two-step theory explaining why bureaucratic overload is detrimental to implementation as well as why politicians under-invest in local bureaucracy, emphasizing a lack of electoral incentives. Drawing on a nationwide survey of local rural development officials across India, including time-usage diaries that measure their daily behavior, we provide quantitative evidence that (i) officials with fewer resources are worse at implementing rural development programs, plausibly because they are unable to allocate enough time to managerial tasks and (ii) fewer resources are provided in administrative units where political responsibility for implementation is less clear. The findings shed light on the political economy and bureaucratic behavior underpinning weak local state capacity.

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Federalism, multi-level elections and social policy in Brazil and India

Cited by 20 publications

References 44 publications

Modi-fying Indian Federalism? Center-State Relations Under Modi's Tenure as Prime Minister

Modi-fying Indian Federalism? Center-State Relations Under Modi's Tenure as Prime Minister

The BJP’s Welfare Schemes: Did They Make a Difference in the 2019 Elections?

The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India

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