Fertility and Pension Programs in LDCs: A Model of Mutual Reinforcement

Entwisle, Barbara; Winegarden, C. R.

doi:10.1086/451388

Cited by 58 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…In column 3 we exclude 9 counties that got their first bank between 1820 and 1840. [20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39] (white population) measured in 1850. The instrument used in column 2 is a dummy taking on a value of 1 if at least a bank was present in the county in 1820.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cain (1981) and Dharmalingam (1994) show this effect in India and Cain (1977Cain ( , 1981 and Jensen (1990) in Bangladesh and Malaysia, respectively. 11 Finally, Kagitcibasi (1982) and Willis (1980) find support for the old-age security hypothesis in a sample of countries emphasizing the importance of cultural aspects whereas Entwisle and Winegarden (1984) and Nugent and Gillapsy (1983) show that having public policies targeted to provide old-age support has a negative effect on fertility.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Each district received at least one bank but after 1814 the state was very reluctant to charter new banks (Bodenhorn, 2008). 20 Since in this context it is indeed hard to argue that the effect of local banks on fertility reflects 20 A few new banks were established after 1820, but this was a quite rare event. Below we eliminate the counties where this was the case.…”

Section: Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fertility and Financial Development: Evidence from U.S. Counties in the 19th Century

Basso

Bodenhorn

Cuberes

2014

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This paper uses data on fertility and financial development in 19th century U.S. to test the hypothesis that more developed local financial markets reduce the incentives for families to have a large offspring to provide for them at old age, the so-called old-age security hypothesis. We find that the presence of banks is associated to lower children-to-women ratios and crude birth rates even after controlling for a large set of socio-economic factors. To account for possible endogeneity of bank location we instrument for the presence of some banking activity in a given county in 1840 with the existence of at least a bank in that county in 1820. The results of using this identification strategy are in line with the OLS ones, namely that fertility in 1850 is negatively affected by financial development. Next we explore the relationship between banking activity and fertility in the state of Pennsylvania, where, by law, most banks were created before 1820. This allows us to treat banks in 1840 as exogenous and confirm the existence of a strong negative causal effect from financial development to fertility. Finally, we show that our results are robust to measuring banking activity with the number of cities with at least a bank in a given county.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fertility and Financial Development: Evidence from U.S. Counties in the 19th Century

Basso

Bodenhorn

Cuberes

2014

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“…Early studies like Entwisle and Winegarden (1984), Hohm (1975), and Nugent and Gillaspy (1983), report cross-country evidence that public pension provision discourages fertility. More recent investigations allow for saving, fertility and, in some cases, educational investment and productivity growth to be jointly determined.…”

Section: Some Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design

Cigno

2009

CESifo Economic Studies

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design Abstract Conventional pension systems suffer from a design defect which makes them financially unsustainable, and a source of inefficiency for the economy as a whole. The paper outlines a second-best policy which includes a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, a Bismarckian one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions in the usual way, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: D13, D64, H55, J13, J14, J26.

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“…Therefore, we infer that, when parents consider children as investment goods, the development of social security policy or financial market are expected to lower fertility and leading to a demographic transition. Indeed, Nugent and Gillaspy (1983) and Entwisle and Winegarden (1984) has shown that the demand for children tends to decrease with the public pension programs development, Hence it seems that the presence of social security tends to substitute public for private transfers as a support for old age and thus provided motivations to have fewer children. However, having few children per household create a large negative externality on the social security pension.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social security family finance and demography

Bouzahzah¹,

Jellal²

2013

Review of Economics and Institutions

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In this paper we analyzed a model of endogenous fertility in presence of f financial market assets and social security pensions. Given the children externality and in the absence of corrective policy, the fertility rate chosen in market economy is too low. Indeed, in his optimal choice of family size, the representative household does not take into account of this children externality which leads to a sub optimal demography. We have shown that an optimal demographic allocation exists and can be implemented through a subvention taxation policy if it is available Mai 2012

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Fertility and Pension Programs in LDCs: A Model of Mutual Reinforcement

Cited by 58 publications

References 10 publications

Fertility and Financial Development: Evidence from U.S. Counties in the 19th Century

Fertility and Financial Development: Evidence from U.S. Counties in the 19th Century

How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design

Social security family finance and demography

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