FIML Estimation of a Bivariate Probit Selection Rule - An Application on Firm Growth and Subsidisation

Reize, Frank

doi:10.2139/ssrn.336525

Cited by 9 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Second, being competitive is endogenous, and there is selection on unobservables into competition that are surely correlated with price. Because such selection is mediated by the auction process, it is not the standard problem in Lee, Maddala, and Trost (), but rather one modelled in the labor literature (Fraker and Moffitt, ; Goux and Maurin, ) and in firm growth models (Reize, ).…”

Section: Effect Of Auction Type On Sales Prices For Competitive Salesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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China's land market auctions: evidence of corruption?

Cai

Henderson

Zhang

2013

The RAND J of Economics

231

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This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003—2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a “two stage auction”. The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are “cold”, which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities.

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Section: Effect Of Auction Type On Sales Prices For Competitive Salesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We thank Frank Reize for access to his STATA code on MLE estimation of the model, to check ex post against our STATA code, although in the end we reprogrammed the model in MATLAB. There seems to be a minor error in Reize () in specification of the LLF.…”

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confidence: 99%

China's land market auctions: evidence of corruption?

Cai

Henderson

Zhang

2013

The RAND J of Economics

231

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“…Being competitive is endogenous, and there is selection on unobservables into competition that are surely correlated with price. Such selection is mediated by the auction process, so it is not the standard problem in Lee, Maddala and Trost (1980), but rather one modeled in the labor literature (Fraker andMoffitt 1988, Goux andMaurin, 2000) and more recently in firm growth models (Reize, 2001). …”

Section: Effect Of Auction Format On Sales Prices For Competitive Salesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…25 We estimate the model by MLE, which yields more efficient estimates than a two step approach that adds two control functions to the price equation to deal with the two dimensions of selection; the two-step approach also has a cumbersome standard error calculation (Reize, 2001). 26 In Table 8, column 2, we present the results for the price corresponding bivariate recursive probit estimates from which Section 5 and Table 6's marginal effects are calculated.…”

Section: Mle Estimation Of the Bivariate Selection Into Competitive mentioning

confidence: 99%

China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption

Cai¹,

Henderson²,

Zhang³

2009

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“…For the bivariate selection model, the expressions for inverses of Mill´s ratios are defined as follows (see Goux and Maurin, 2000, Reize, 2001or Reize, 2004b: …”

Section: Appendixmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of FDI on Innovation in Target Firms

Stiebale

Reize

2008

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors. Terms of use: Documents in The Impact of FDI on Innovation in Target FirmsAbstract This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the welfare effects of foreign direct investment by investigating the effects of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on innovation activities in target firms. The empirical analysis is based on survey and ownership data for a large sample of small-and mediumsized German firms. After controlling for endogeneity and selection bias, it is found that foreign takeovers have a large negative impact on the propensity to perform innovation activities and a negative impact on average R&D expenditures in innovative firms. Furthermore, innovation output, measured as the share of sales from product innovations is not significantly affected by a foreign takeover for a given amount of innovation efforts. Hence, the estimation results do not show any evidence of significant technology spillovers through foreign direct investment in form of a higher innovation success.JEL Classification: D21, F23, G34, C31, O31, O33

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FIML Estimation of a Bivariate Probit Selection Rule - An Application on Firm Growth and Subsidisation

Cited by 9 publications

References 16 publications

China's land market auctions: evidence of corruption?

China's land market auctions: evidence of corruption?

China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption

The Impact of FDI on Innovation in Target Firms

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