2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2180014
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Financial Constitutions in the EU: From the Political to the Legal Constitution?

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The "golden rule" constitutionalizes an obligation on executives to propose and legislatures to approve balanced-budget laws yearly.121 Because in the majority of EU countries the existence of a constitutional provision makes it justiciable, the constitutionalization of the "golden rule" inevitably strengthens the role of courts as guardians of fiscal discipline and comptrollers of the budgetary policies of the political branches. 122 The increasing empowerment of state courts as a result of developments in EU law is in itself nothing new.123 Many scholars have emphasized how EU law has consistently enhanced the institutional position of courts vis-à-vis the political branches of EU member states.124 Nevertheless, whereas EU law has traditionally favored the position of ordinary judges, the introduction of the "golden rule" in the state constitutions benefits the role of Constitutional Courts. 125 In most EU member states, including all four case studies considered in this Article, the task of reviewing the constitutionality of legislation is centralized in ad hoc, specialized Constitutional Courts.126 It is therefore plausible that Constitutional Courts in Germany, Spain, Italy, and (in case) France, will through the adoption of the "golden rule" acquire new and pervasive competences in the fiscal field, including the ability to scrutinize-and strike down-the budgets approved by Parliaments, to ensure compliance with the constitutional budgetary constraints.…”
Section: B the Role Of State Courtsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The "golden rule" constitutionalizes an obligation on executives to propose and legislatures to approve balanced-budget laws yearly.121 Because in the majority of EU countries the existence of a constitutional provision makes it justiciable, the constitutionalization of the "golden rule" inevitably strengthens the role of courts as guardians of fiscal discipline and comptrollers of the budgetary policies of the political branches. 122 The increasing empowerment of state courts as a result of developments in EU law is in itself nothing new.123 Many scholars have emphasized how EU law has consistently enhanced the institutional position of courts vis-à-vis the political branches of EU member states.124 Nevertheless, whereas EU law has traditionally favored the position of ordinary judges, the introduction of the "golden rule" in the state constitutions benefits the role of Constitutional Courts. 125 In most EU member states, including all four case studies considered in this Article, the task of reviewing the constitutionality of legislation is centralized in ad hoc, specialized Constitutional Courts.126 It is therefore plausible that Constitutional Courts in Germany, Spain, Italy, and (in case) France, will through the adoption of the "golden rule" acquire new and pervasive competences in the fiscal field, including the ability to scrutinize-and strike down-the budgets approved by Parliaments, to ensure compliance with the constitutional budgetary constraints.…”
Section: B the Role Of State Courtsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…122 The increasing empowerment of state courts as a result of developments in EU law is in itself nothing new.123 Many scholars have emphasized how EU law has consistently enhanced the institutional position of courts vis-à-vis the political branches of EU member states.124 Nevertheless, whereas EU law has traditionally favored the position of ordinary judges, the introduction of the "golden rule" in the state constitutions benefits the role of Constitutional Courts. 125 In most EU member states, including all four case studies considered in this Article, the task of reviewing the constitutionality of legislation is centralized in ad hoc, specialized Constitutional Courts.126 It is therefore plausible that Constitutional Courts in Germany, Spain, Italy, and (in case) France, will through the adoption of the "golden rule" acquire new and pervasive competences in the fiscal field, including the ability to scrutinize-and strike down-the budgets approved by Parliaments, to ensure compliance with the constitutional budgetary constraints.…”
Section: B the Role Of State Courtsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this respect, fiscal rules seek to spread the benefits/burdens across generations without privileging or penalising a particular cohort. Several countries explicitly enshrine this principle in their constitutions; notably, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Spain all adopted balanced-budget laws in their constitutions during the period 2009-2011 (Delledonne, 2012). Fiscal rules may also help mitigate some of the pressures of population ageing (Lee and Moon, 2013;Anderson et al, 2014), as they force governments to adopt policy measures to cope with rising costs due to geriatric care and pension obligations.…”
Section: Responding To the Objective Of Intergenerational Fairnessmentioning
confidence: 99%