The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance 2021
DOI: 10.1017/9781108759458.024
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Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers: A Short Survey

Abstract: Whistleblower reward programs, or "bounty regimes", are increasingly used in the United States. The effectiveness of these programs have been questioned, and empirical evidence on their effectiveness have been scarce likely due to their relatively recent introduction. In recent years, however, empirical and experimental evidence on their effectiveness have become more available and robust. We review the (rather encouraging) evidence on whistleblower reward programs, in terms of amount of additional information… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…To enhance second-order compliance, others have called for whistleblower rewards to those who report non-compliance by covered institutions (Spagnolo and Nyreröd, 2021a, Scarcella, 2021), and the USA recently passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AMLA), which provides for awards to whistleblowers who bring forward information about violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) that covers SARs and obligations on financial institutions. Nevertheless, these recent policy responses that squarely put the problem on first and second-order non-compliance may be obscuring more fundamental issues with the global AML regime.…”
Section: Global Anti-money Laundering Preventative Regimementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…To enhance second-order compliance, others have called for whistleblower rewards to those who report non-compliance by covered institutions (Spagnolo and Nyreröd, 2021a, Scarcella, 2021), and the USA recently passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AMLA), which provides for awards to whistleblowers who bring forward information about violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) that covers SARs and obligations on financial institutions. Nevertheless, these recent policy responses that squarely put the problem on first and second-order non-compliance may be obscuring more fundamental issues with the global AML regime.…”
Section: Global Anti-money Laundering Preventative Regimementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rewards have been available in the US AML context under the Bank Secrecy Act, but, in contrast to the above-mentioned US programmes, these rewards were handed out entirely at the treasury’s discretion and were capped at $150,000. There is little evidence that discretionary rewards in this lower range are effective at eliciting information (Spagnolo and Nyreröd, 2021b), particularly quality information from high-level employees. Perhaps because of this, AMLA 2021 replaced the $150,000 reward with a reward of up to 30% of the fines paid for BSA violations, bringing it more in line with the SEC and IRS programmes.…”
Section: Background On Reward Programmesmentioning
confidence: 99%