Whistleblower rewards have been used extensively in the US to limit procurement fraud and tax evasion, and their use has been extended to fight financial fraud after the recent financial crisis. There is currently a debate on their possible introduction in Europe, but authorities there appear considerably less enthusiastic than their US counterparts. While it is important that these tools are scrutinized in a lively democratic debate, many things have been written-even by important institutional players-that have no empirical backing or that are in open contrast to the available evidence from independent research. In this paper we review some of the most debated issues regarding the potential benefits and costs of financial incentives for whistleblowers, while trying to separate existing evidence from conjectures with no empirical support, and myths in contrast to available evidence.

Whistleblower reward programs, or "bounty regimes", are increasingly used in the United States. The effectiveness of these programs have been questioned, and empirical evidence on their effectiveness have been scarce likely due to their relatively recent introduction. In recent years, however, empirical and experimental evidence on their effectiveness have become more available and robust. We review the (rather encouraging) evidence on whistleblower reward programs, in terms of amount of additional information generated, deterrence effects, and administration costs, and consider the possibility of extending them to accomplice-witnesses in antitrust.

Purpose With sanctions becoming an increasingly important tool in ostracising autocratic regimes from western markets, the need for effective enforcement of sanctions and anti-money laundering (AML) is increasing, and the global AML regime will be the backbone to detecting evasion of sanctions. This regime, however, has been widely criticised as ineffective. This paper aims to discuss issues with the current sanctions/AML regime and propose a reward scheme for whistleblowers to enable asset seizures that is not reliant on its effectiveness. Design/methodology/approach This paper reviews weaknesses in the global AML regime, provide suggestions on how to design whistleblower reward programmes, based on agency experience and empirical evidence, as well as elaborate on how to use such programmes in the AML context. Findings This study concludes that for reward programmes to be effective in the context of AML and sanctions enforcement, they need to include witness protection and leniency for money launderers, though not for those convicted of a criminal offence associated with the predicate crime. Moreover, rewards should be mandatory and scale with the amount of money seized or confiscated, and the cap on monetary rewards should be higher than it is under the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Programme in the USA. Originality/value In contrast to how the USA went about implementing rewards in this area under the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Programme, this study argues that these programmes should be designed differently. This study also provides novel advice to governments on different design dimensions in the AML context and a model with three crucial pillars along with other design dimensions that should be considered.

Recent years have seen a rapid increase in legislation governing, protecting, and rewarding whistleblowers. Whereas the EU recently enacted a Directive protecting whistleblowers, the US has gone one step further long ago, not only protecting them but also offering substantial monetary rewards for their information. In this paper. we review the evidence for the effectiveness of US whistleblower reward programs and consider some recent novelties. We also consider objections against these programs and local factors in the US that likely contribute to their success. Finally, we voice some concerns over the EU Directive´s ability to achieve its policy objective of enhancing enforcement of Union law.

Research on whistleblowing has increased significantly in the last decades, and so has the number of laws governing whistleblowing. Whereas the EU recently enacted a Directive (Directive 2019/1937) protecting whistleblowers, the US has gone one step further long ago, not only protecting them but also offering substantial monetary rewards for their information. More countries are now adopting reward programs, while numerous recent instances of corporate wrongdoing suggest that the central promise of these programs: increasing detection and deterrence of wrongdoing, is highly needed not only in the US. These developments warrant a review on the optimal design of these programs, based on experience and available evidence, to obtain optimal deterrence and avoid policy mistakes. In this paper, we review the evidence for the effectiveness of the US whistleblower reward programs and consider some recent novelties. We also consider objections against these programs and local factors in the US that likely contribute to their success. Finally, we voice some concerns over the EU Directive’s ability to achieve its policy objective of enhancing enforcement of Union law. We find that the evidence for the effectiveness of reward programs is significant, and that common concerns about these programs have not materialized. Whereas much of the prior literature has focused on their viability and effectiveness, further research would do well in focusing on how to effectively design these programs, what has driven their success, and what local national characteristics could hamper their effectiveness outside the US.