2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2013.11.007
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Firm opacity and financial market information asymmetry

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
17
0

Year Published

2015
2015
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

1
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 37 publications
(17 citation statements)
references
References 55 publications
0
17
0
Order By: Relevance
“…These seemingly contradictory results suggest that the relationship between firmto-investor information asymmetry and inter-investor information asymmetry cannot be monotonic. In an attempt to explain the contradiction, Ravi and Hong (2012) propose a unimodal relation between the two types of information asymmetry. They find that the inter-investor information asymmetry increases, and then declines, as the firm-to-investor information asymmetry decreases from absolutely opaque situations to perfectly transparent situations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These seemingly contradictory results suggest that the relationship between firmto-investor information asymmetry and inter-investor information asymmetry cannot be monotonic. In an attempt to explain the contradiction, Ravi and Hong (2012) propose a unimodal relation between the two types of information asymmetry. They find that the inter-investor information asymmetry increases, and then declines, as the firm-to-investor information asymmetry decreases from absolutely opaque situations to perfectly transparent situations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A voluminous literature addresses information asymmetries in markets wherein heterogeneous information sets enable sophisticated or informed traders to outperform relatively uninformed traders (Grossman and Stiglitz, ; Hellwig, ; Kyle, ). Thus, the informational environment of a stock is an important factor in determining its liquidity (Healy and Palepu, ; Ravi and Hong, ). More opaque firms, where the information environment is not as transparent, have larger bid‐ask spreads.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In building the conceptual framework for SMME lending, we borrow information from the asymmetric information theory (Stiglitz & Weiss 1981), and advance the fact that lending to SMMEs hinges on lending technologies used, which in turn are subject to the level of information available to the potential lender (Allen 2016;Butler, Kraft & Weiss 2007;Mac et al 2016;Mullen 2012;Ravi & Hong 2014). From that analogy, we propose that credit rationing is a function of the costs and benefits associated with each type of lending technology.…”
Section: Data and Research Designmentioning
confidence: 99%