First Author Conditions

Engers, Maxim; Gans, Joshua S.; Grant, Simon; King, Stephen P.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.90728

Cited by 53 publications

(83 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…First, it provides a formal economic treatment of negotiation over attribution rights, a topic that so far has been quite neglected by economists. One notable exception is Engers et al (1999), who develop a model of bargaining over authors' order in a paper, and show that alphabetic ordering (which is widespread in economics) can be a sustainable equilibrium (as opposed to the relative contribution ordering, more common in other disciplines). However, Engers et al do not consider bargaining over inventorship, as we do, or the possibility of exclusions (from papers or patents).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inventorship and authorship as attribution rights: An enquiry into the economics of scientific credit

Lissoni

Montobbio

Zirulia

2013

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

a b s t r a c tAuthorship and inventorship are "attribution rights" upon which individual scientists build their reputation and career. Social and legal norms concerning their distribution within research teams are currently criticized for failing to inform third parties on individual contributions. We examine the case of teams engaged in the "double disclosure" of their research results through both publications and patents, and model the negotiation process taking place between junior or female team members and the senior (male) ones. We suggest that the former may give up inventorship in order to secure authorship, even when entitled to the both. Based on a sample of 680 "patent-publication pairs" (related sets of patents and publications) we show that, very frequently, one or more authors of a publication do not appear as inventors of a related patent. This is less likely to happen for first and last authors, which is in accordance both with our model and the prevailing legal norms on inventorship. However, the probability of exclusion from inventorship also declines with seniority, and increases for women, which is compatible with our model only.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inventorship and authorship as attribution rights: An enquiry into the economics of scientific credit

Lissoni

Montobbio

Zirulia

2013

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, these explanations are not without limitations. Engers et al (1999), for example, employ a game-theoretic framework and suggest that alphabetical listings in economics arise as a result of a signaling equilibrium between authors and the market. While this helps explain the high incidence of alphabetized listings in economics, it cannot explain the lack of alphabetization in related disciplines such as agricultural economics.…”

Section: Concluding Commentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We begin by describing the work of Engers et al (1999). As mentioned previously, their objective is to provide a theoretical explanation for the widespread use of alphabetical name orderings in economics.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Author Order and Research Quality

Joseph¹,

Laband²,

Patil³

2005

Southern Economic Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We observe a great deal of heterogeneity in the manner in which author orderings are assigned both across and within academic markets. To better understand this phenomenon, we develop and analyze a stochastic model of author orderings. In our model, authors work equally hard to obtain priority in listings but linal contributions arc stochastic. Further, research outlets differ in their quality hurdles. In this setting, our simulation results are consistent with two empirical regularities. First, we lind that the rate of alphabetization increases with the stringency with which papers are accepted for publication. Second, conditional on clearing the publication hurdle, quality increases with alphabetization. These findings arise because increases in the publication hurdle make it more likely that authors will exceed this threshold only when both contribute a high amount. This, in turn, leads to roughly equal contributions I alphabetization I and also generates a positive correlation between alphabetization and quality.

show abstract

“…Following Engers et al (1999) In making an assessment, it is assumed that the market (a) knows the roles (or competencies) of each scientist in a team and (b) assesses both the quality of a project and also forms beliefs over each scientist's relative contribution. The rationale for (a) is that the project is coming out of P's lab and so P's status, role and competency are broadly understood.…”

Section: Market Attributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Markets for Scientific Attribution

Gans

Murray

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

First Author Conditions

Cited by 53 publications

References 4 publications

Inventorship and authorship as attribution rights: An enquiry into the economics of scientific credit

Inventorship and authorship as attribution rights: An enquiry into the economics of scientific credit

Author Order and Research Quality

Markets for Scientific Attribution

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About