First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem

Sebastián, Miguel Ángel

doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00564-4

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…Alternatively, as proposed by Sebastián (2022), it may be the case that an experience represents, for instance, 'I am moving', but the particular object to which the indexical 'I' refers does not figure in content. This proposal can be interpreted in two ways: (a) that subject does not figure in content, or (b) that the particular subject (like Mary) does not figure in content, but the subject-related content is a general content which involves 'a subject'.…”

Section: Self-location Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If (b) is selected, then a subject-element of content may determine the phenomenology of self-motion by being associated with visual phenomenology (but this entails the rejection of intuition PI-1) or may figure in content without influencing the phenomenology (but then it cannot determine the subject-involving phenomenology of self-motion). Another option inspired by Sebastián's (2022) framework is to weaken the intuition PI-2 by denying that in the self-motion case the subject is experienced as the entity to which the movement is attributed. This opens a possibility for postulating, consistently with intuition PI-1, that when self-motion occurs, the content such as 'I am moving' is realised by representing some movement-related property without additionally representing the subject-element to which the movement-related property is attributed.…”

Section: Self-location Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perspectival content of visual experiences

Skrzypulec

2023

Inquiry

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The usual visual experiences possess a perspectival phenomenology as they seem to present objects from a certain perspective. Nevertheless, it is not obvious how to characterise experiential content determining such phenomenology. In particular, while there are many works investigating perspectival properties of experienced objects, a question regarding how subject is represented in visual perspectival experiences attracted less attention. In order to address this problem, I consider four popular phenomenal intuitions regarding perspectival experiences and argue that the major theories of perspectival experiences do not account for all of them. Relying on these observations, I show how a theory which accommodates all these intuitions can be developed by (a) recognising that visual perspectival experiences are, in fact, multimodal visuo-bodily experiences and (b) distinguishing between egocentric and structural contents.

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Section: Self-location Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Self-location Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perspectival content of visual experiences

Skrzypulec

2023

Inquiry

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Consciousness and Perspectival De Se content

Sebastián

2024

Synthese

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Most people think indexical thought has special content (de se content). However, it has been acknowledged that classical examples, such as those offered by Perry and Lewis, are insufficient to establish this conclusion. Ongoing discussions typically focus on first-person beliefs and their relationship to the explanation of successful behavior and linguistic practices. Instead, I want to direct attention to the phenomenal content of our conscious experiences and the largely neglected contribution that its comprehension can make to the way in which first-person representation is understood. This paper offers a novel argument for both the existence and a specific interpretation of the essential indexicality thesis based on widely accepted assumptions regarding the relation between phenomenology and representation. Specifically, I will argue that if (i) two different individuals can have token experiences with the same phenomenology and ii) two token experiences of ordinary subjects with the same phenomenology have the same phenomenal content, then phenomenal content is de se content of a particular kind: perspectival de se content.

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Conscious perception in favour of essential indexicality

Sebastián¹

2022

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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It has been widely acknowledged that indexical thought poses a problem for traditional theories of mental content. However, recent work in philosophy has defied this received view and challenged its defenders not to rely on intuitions but rather to clearly articulate what the problem is supposed to be. For example, in "The Inessential Indexical", Cappelen and Dever claim that there are no philosophically interesting or important roles played by essential indexical representations. This paper assesses the role of essential indexicality in understanding the content of perception and argues that, if the perceptual experiences of different subjects can have the same phenomenology, and thus share a representational content (phenomenal content)-assumptions shared by a well-established research project, including a wide variety of theories-, then phenomenal content exhibit a particular kind of essential indexicality (perspectival). I also discuss how the argument is immune to Cappelen and Dever's objections to the idea that the content of perceptual experiences is essentially indexical.

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First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem

Cited by 3 publications

References 70 publications

Perspectival content of visual experiences

Perspectival content of visual experiences

Consciousness and Perspectival De Se content

Conscious perception in favour of essential indexicality

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