2013
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1379-3
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Fiscal and monetary policy interactions: a game theory approach

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Cited by 20 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…Yet, there is still the need to use a repeated game model or a sequential (or dynamic) game model between monetary and fiscal authorities. Further research is suggested to use the dynamic game model, based on the Saulo et al (2013) theoretical framework.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet, there is still the need to use a repeated game model or a sequential (or dynamic) game model between monetary and fiscal authorities. Further research is suggested to use the dynamic game model, based on the Saulo et al (2013) theoretical framework.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Studies on the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy have been conducted by Clarida et al (2000), Buti (2003), Canzoneri et al (2006), Flanagan et al (2011), Badarau and Levieuge (2011), Saulo et al (2013), andCui (2016), among others, all of whom considered the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy to be beneficial. At the same time, Libich and Nguyen (2015) show that such coordination might be problematic.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Coordinating these two policies is important for the economy because decisions made by one authority may have a negative impact on the other authority's results, causing a deterioration in the welfare of society. Coordinating fiscal and monetary policy should contribute to resolving conflicts of interest, as each decision-maker primarily deals with its goals (Saulo et al, 2013). Frankel and Rockett (1986) indicated that, overall, it would be better for countries to run a cooperative game than a non-cooperative one, in which each government sets its own policy regardless of the policy taken by the other side.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This type of model, and the structure of presentation of them, stem from the seminal work by Reference [27], and have been used from then when analyzing interactions among economic policies. See for instance References [28][29][30], and the references therein.…”
Section: Sustainable Economic Policies: a Simulation Exercisementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Notice that one of the features of macroeconomic models based on demand vs. supply analysis (see for instance References [28][29][30], and the references therein) is that at the aggregate level, a vast variety of economic policies (and even disturbances) lead to the same result (basically everything translates in changes of prices or/and output). However, given that the interest of the analysis it to find the most efficient way to achieve a specific result, in our particular analysis, we offer an array of results (in terms of welfare) to provide information about the conditions (in terms of demand-short-run oriented) under which a technological shock (supply-side, with long-run implications) would provide a higher level of welfare.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%