Flexible collective bargaining agreements: Still a moderating effect on works council behaviour?

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Analysing institutional changes and augmenting a theoretical model provides hypotheses, which are then tested using empirical analysis of representative German plant level data. We find that the existence of flexibility provisions in collective bargaining agreements do not drive works council behaviour towards rent-seeking. Terms of use: Documents inRegarding rent-generation, we find an amplifying effect: works council existence is associated with higher productivity in plants covered by industry-level contracts.These findings, however, depend on the level of collective bargaining: they do not hold in plants covered by firm-level contracts.

Owner‐Managers and the Failure of Newly Adopted Works Councils

“…Works councils exert a positive effect on productivity in establishments covered by collective bargaining agreements but not in uncovered establishments. The positive interaction effect of works councils and collective bargaining coverage on productivity is confirmed by several other studies (Braendle ; Jirjahn ; Jirjahn and Mueller ; Renaud ; Wagner ; Wagner et al . )…”

“…Works councils exert a positive effect on productivity in establishments covered by collective bargaining agreements but not in uncovered establishments. The positive interaction effect of works councils and collective bargaining coverage on productivity is confirmed by several other studies (Braendle 2013;Jirjahn 2003b;Jirjahn and Mueller 2014;Renaud 2008;Wagner 2008;Wagner et al 2006). 8 There is even evidence that collective bargaining coverage fosters a positive effect of works councils on profitability (Huebler 2003;Mueller 2011).…”

Why is there resistance to works councils in Germany? An economic perspective

“…This relationship has been confirmed by other studies (including Wagner et al, 2006;Wagner, 2008;Jirjahn and Müller, 2014;Brändle, 2013). Some studies also substantiate this interaction effect even when the samples comprise only smaller and medium-sized establishments (e.g., Jirjahn, 2003a;Wagner, 2008), though in a more recent study by Jirjahn and Müller (2014), the interaction was no longer significant for small firms.…”

“…More recent studies published since the last comprehensive literature review (Jirjahn, 2011) support the conclusion that correlations between the works council and productivity are largely positive (Brändle, 2013;Hübler, 2015;Jirjahn and Müller, 2014;Müller, 2012Müller, , 2015Pfeifer, 2011). To obtain a complete picture, however, two points must be taken into account:…”

The one constant: a causal effect of collective bargaining on employment growth? Evidence from German linked‐employer‐employee data

“…Works councils can affect pay scales, dismissal behaviour as well as organisational issues and have a significant impact on firm behaviour. As a consequence of the interaction with sector‐wide bargaining agreements, works council activities have been shown to be beneficial in covered firms (Brändle, ). While in decline, this dual system of industrial relations still covers the majority of employees (Addison et al ., , Ellguth and Kohaut, ).…”