Flexible Election Timing and International Conflict

Abstract

While there are a large number of studies examining the differences in conflict behavior due to varying institutional arrangements, scholars have not effectively addressed the differences in electoral cycles between systems with fixed versus flexible election timing. At the same time that parliamentary regimes give the Prime Minister the power to dissolve parliament, they give the parliament the power to remove the government with a vote of no-confidence. Together, these institutional attributes make the precise timing of the elections-and thus the public's opportunity to hold the government accountable-largely uncertain. I develop a theory that expectations of an upcoming election constrain the foreign policy decision making of executives, and induce pacific behavior. I estimate the probability of an election in a sample of 17 advanced parliamentary democracies from the 1950s to 2001. I find convincing support for my theory, as the probability of hostile dispute initiation is a function of those characteristics that influence the timing of elections, including majority support and the electoral cycle. More specifically, majority and minority governments face varying incentives to initiate disputes because of the different risks of an immediate election.Electorally motivated leaders make foreign policy choices with an eye toward the next election. In this manner, the threat of performing poorly in an upcoming election constrains the foreign policy behavior of executives. It is peculiar, then, that scholars have not effectively addressed the differences in electoral cycles between systems with fixed versus flexible election timing. In these systems, an election can be called at virtually any time as a result of decisions made by the government-by dissolving parliament-or the opposition-via a successful vote of no-confidence. Though both actors can trigger early elections and an election must be called by a specific date, the exact timing of elections is often uncertain and the object of intense speculation. If executives choose their foreign policies with an eye toward the next election, then we should give more attention to the differences in election timing in systems with fixed versus flexible timing.I develop a theory that electoral cycles influence the conflict behavior by determining the timing of the opportunities for the public to hold the government accountable. As the anticipated risk of an early election increases, governments become less aggressive because of fear of electoral retribution. I test this theory on a sample of 17 advanced parliamentary democracies from the 1950s to 2001. I first use country-specific models of election timing based on government-and national-level attributes as well as policy performance to generate the probability of an immediate election, which I argue represents an accurate approximation of real-world expectations. My expectation is that the probability of dispute initiation will be highest when the probability of an early election is lowest. I find support for this prop...

Lame‐Duck Foreign Policy

“…Others have also noted that predictable and flexible election timing has a substantial impact on democratic constraint. Williams (2013) argues that the expectation of an upcoming election constrain the foreign policy decision making of executives-a point very much in keeping with the argument that I make here. Finally, Haynes (2012) points out that if elections are the primary source of a democratic leader's accountability, a president's credibility should disappear once they are ineligible for reelection.…”

Death and Turnout: The Human Costs of War and Voter Participation in Democracies

“…Lastly, our research speaks to recent studies examining variation in political institutions, governing arrangements, and conflict behavior. This research largely focuses on variation in institutions (e.g., presidential versus parliamentary; Leblang and Chan ) or the composition of party coalitions (Clare ; Koch ; Williams ), but it may also be fruitful to examine the electorate since the costs of war appear to change its composition. As the human costs of war bring more people into the political process who have been mobilized to defend their values, wartime leaders may be more constrained in their choices, making them less likely to end international conflicts.…”

Some Agents are Freer than Others: Variation in the Reelection Incentive, Agency Loss, and the Timing of Democratic Interstate Conflict

“…More recent research emphasizes ex post constraints, examining how a leader's political security affects decisions over when and whether to engage in international conflicts (Bueno de Mesquita et al ; Chiozza and Goemans ; ; Koch ; Williams , Wolford ). This research suggests that the political insecurity of leaders is a key driver in the foreign policy behavior of states.…”

“…. Two exceptions to this areKoch (2009) andWilliams (2013). Both use the time remaining until the next mandated election as part of the accountability equation.…”