Fluctuation in construction costs and its effect on contract renegotiation behavior in PPP wastewater treatment projects: An evolutionary game analysis

Lv, Junna; Lin, Minqing; Zhou, Wen

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.128025

Cited by 19 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Second, the risk assessment model had the characteristics of strong theory, large amount of calculation and complex model, which was difficult to play a role in practical application and was popularized. Benefit distribution was mostly determined on the basis of stakeholder analysis and combined with benefit influencing factors Cai et al (2021) and Lv et al (2021). In the existing research on benefit distribution of PPP projects, the expression of the influencing factors of ECAM 30,9 benefit distribution was vague and subjective, such as investment proportion (Viegas, 2010), and the solution accuracy of the comprehensive correction coefficient was poor, which was difficult to objectively and reasonably reflect the actual benefit distribution of construction waste treatment PPP mode in China context.…”

Section: Benefit Distribution Of Ppp Projectmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Risk allocation and benefit distribution of PPP projects for construction waste recycling: a case study of China

Wang

Zhou

Jin

et al. 2022

ECAM

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PurposePublic-private partnership (PPP) projects for construction waste recycling have become the main approach to construction waste treatment in China. Risk sharing and income distribution of PPP projects play a vital role in achieving project success. This paper is aimed at building a practical and effective risk sharing and income distribution model to achieve win–win situation among different stakeholders, thereby providing a systematic framework for governments to promote construction waste recycling.Design/methodology/approachStakeholders of construction waste recycling PPP projects were reclassified according to the stakeholder theory. Best-worst multi–criteria decision-making method and comprehensive fuzzy evaluation method (BWM–FCE) risk assessment model was constructed to optimize the risk assessment of core stakeholders in construction waste recycling PPP projects. Based on the proposed risk evaluation model for construction waste recycling PPP projects, the Shapley value income distribution model was modified in combination with capital investment, contribution and project participation to obtain a more equitable and reasonable income distribution system.FindingsThe income distribution model showed that PPP Project Companies gained more transaction benefits, which proved that PPP Project Companies played an important role in the actual operation of PPP projects. The policy change risk, investment and financing risk and income risk were the most important risks and key factors for project success. Therefore, it is of great significance to strengthen the management of PPP Project Companies, and in the process of PPP implementation, the government should focus on preventing the risk of policy changes, investment and financing risks and income risks.Practical implicationsThe findings from this study have advanced the application methods of risk sharing and income distribution for PPP projects and further improved PPP project-related theories. It helps to promote and rationalize fairness in construction waste recycling PPP projects and to achieve mutual benefits and win–win situation in risk sharing. It has also provided a reference for resource management of construction waste and laid a solid foundation for long-term development of construction waste resources.Originality/valuePPP mode is an effective tool for construction waste recycling. How to allocate risks and distribute benefits has become the most important issue of waste recycling PPP projects, and also the key to project success. The originality of this study resides in its provision of a holistic approach of risk allocation and benefit distribution on construction waste PPP projects in China as a developing country. Accordingly, this study adds its value by promoting resource development of construction waste, extending an innovative risk allocation and benefit distribution method in PPP projects, and providing a valuable reference for policymakers and private investors who are planning to invest in PPP projects in China.

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Section: Benefit Distribution Of Ppp Projectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Benefit distribution was mostly determined on the basis of stakeholder analysis and combined with benefit influencing factors Cai et al. (2021) and Lv et al. (2021).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk allocation and benefit distribution of PPP projects for construction waste recycling: a case study of China

Wang

Zhou

Jin

et al. 2022

ECAM

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“…The simulation results show that to ensure that inland waterway shipping pollution is effectively managed, both upstream and downstream governments should actively implement supervision and ensure the use of clean energy by shipping companies through institutions and policies. For public-private partnership (PPP) projects in wastewater treatment, Estalaki et al (2015) and Lv et al (2021) constructed different evolutionary game models to analyze the dynamic game of stakeholders. Wang et al (2021) discussed how energy investment companies promote the development of solar thermal power and nuclear power in the context of carbon neutrality.…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary analysis of Japan's nuclear wastewater discharge events considering the impact of participants' emotions

Xin

Liu

Wang

et al. 2022

Ocean & Coastal Management

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“…A market-oriented regulatory framework is better than inflexible orders and controls 38 , 39 . There has been a lack of rigorous mathematical demonstration in existing work 40 , 41 . Some studies show deficiencies in the impact analysis of parameter changes 42 , 43 .The greater the incentive of the central government is, the greater the probability of enterprises and local governments choosing environmentally friendly strategies 44 , 45 , but dynamic analysis is lacking.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

Zhou

Wang

Tang³

2022

Sci Rep

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This paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

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Fluctuation in construction costs and its effect on contract renegotiation behavior in PPP wastewater treatment projects: An evolutionary game analysis

Cited by 19 publications

References 30 publications

Risk allocation and benefit distribution of PPP projects for construction waste recycling: a case study of China

Risk allocation and benefit distribution of PPP projects for construction waste recycling: a case study of China

Evolutionary analysis of Japan's nuclear wastewater discharge events considering the impact of participants' emotions

Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

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