Folk Core Beliefs about Color

Roberts, Pendaran; Schmidtke, Kelly Ann

doi:10.1007/s13164-019-00437-w

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 48 publications

(46 reference statements)

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“…A starting point for primitivism is the ordinary practice of colour name ascription, which treats objects as the bearers of colours that are available to intersubjective visual inspection. Some work in experimental philosophy has sought to verify the primitivist's construal of the core commitments involved in this practice (Roberts & Schmidtke, ). Furthermore, the human and social sciences of colour, such as anthropology and linguistics (e.g., Anderson et al ), are domains of scientific research most relevant to the primitivist and not psychophysics, neuroscience, or any of the physical sciences.…”

Section: Naturalism As Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

Naturalism and the philosophy of colour ontology and perception

Chirimuuta

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Section: Naturalism As Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

Naturalism and the philosophy of colour ontology and perception

Chirimuuta

2020

Philosophy Compass

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“…We think that some of Johnston's "core beliefs" are accurate characterizations of aspects of the contemporary "common sense" conception of color. There is experimental evidence(Roberts and Schmidtke, 2019) that provides some support to the claim that the "core beliefs" correctly characterize our contemporary "common sense" conception of color. In particular, it seems hard to dispute that both Paradigms and Unity are aspects of contemporary "common sense" ways of thinking about color.…”

mentioning

confidence: 92%

The Myth of the Common-sense Conception of Colour

Adams¹,

Hansen²

2020

Shifting Concepts

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Some philosophical theories of the nature of colour aim to respect a ‘common sense’ conception of colour: aligning with the common sense conception is supposed to speak in favour of a theory and conflicting with it is supposed to speak against a theory. This chapter argues that the idea of a ‘common sense’ conception of colour that philosophers of colour have relied upon is overly simplistic. By drawing on experimental and historical evidence, it demonstrates how conceptions of colour vary along several dimensions and how even supposedly ‘core’ components of the contemporary ‘common sense’ conception of colour are less stable than previously thought.

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“…5 For recent experimental literature on folk colour beliefs see e.g. Adams and Hansen (2020), Cohen and Nichols (2010), Roberts et al (2014) and Roberts and Schmidtke (2019). 6 I regard Cohen (2009) and Chirimuuta (2015) as the most important defenses of Ecumenical Relationalism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For recent discussion see again e.g Adams and Hansen (2020),Cohen and Nichols (2010),Roberts et al (2014). andRoberts and Schmidtke (2019). A third objection stems from circularity, which roughly charges that Relationalism defines blue by reference to experiencing/looking blue, and vice versa, and that this is a vicious form of circularity.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Colour variation without objective colour

Brown

2022

PhiMiSci

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Colour variation is the fact that what colour physical objects look to have depends on viewing conditions and a perceiver’s visual system. Both Colour Relationalists and Colour Eliminativists regard their analyses of colour variation as central to the justification for their respective views. Yet the analyses are decidedly different. Colour Relationalists assert that most instances of colour variation are veridical and infer from this that colours are relational properties of objects that are partly determined by perceivers. By contrast, Colour Eliminativists assert that colour variation is too unsystematic to ground the claim that many or most instances of colour variation are veridical. From this they infer that objects don’t have colours. I argue that the Eliminativist analysis is superior. On my view, the Relationalist account of veridical colour experience reduces to the assertion that objects have colour simply because they cause perceivers to have colour experiences of them. In this context, I argue, the resulting conception of veridicality is vacuous. More directly, the foundational idea of Eliminativism is the opposite claim: the fact that objects cause perceivers to have colour experiences of them is on its own not sufficient to justify or ground the claim that objects have colour. The Relationalist, I argue, has failed to justify anything stronger than this. In this debate we should thus side with the Eliminativist: objects do not possess colour; they merely cause us to undergo colour experiences.

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Folk Core Beliefs about Color

Cited by 6 publications

References 48 publications

Naturalism and the philosophy of colour ontology and perception

Naturalism and the philosophy of colour ontology and perception

The Myth of the Common-sense Conception of Colour

Colour variation without objective colour

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