This paper explores the drivers of pro-worker reforms in Vietnam. It shows how commerce, trade deals, aid, and geopolitics strengthened support for higher wages, social dialogue, and freedom of association. Strikes have triggered Government concerns about regime legitimacy. Manufactures are also keen to resolve strikes and propitiate reputation-conscious buyers. Reform was further incentivised by TPP's stipulation of Freedom of Association, together with economic and geopolitical incentives to join TPP. Donor-supported pilots have not motivated reform, but are nonetheless important: enabling reformists to explore new ideas; iteratively adapt; garner evidence of what furthers their priorities; with which they can persuade anxious colleagues. None of these forces are deterministic. They merely stimulate debate, authorise experimentation and are used by coalitions to push for reform. By tracing the politics of pro-worker reforms, this study draws attention to drivers often overlooked by donors: strikes, commerce, and trade deals. 1 Reform (doimoi) commenced in December 1986. GDP growth has since averaged 7%. Between 1993 and 2012, the proportion of people living in ext reme poverty ($1 a day) fell from 59% to 15% (World Bank, 2012). Vietnam's garment industry employs 2.5 million people, in 6'000 enterprises: 59% are private domestic, 36% foreign and 3% state-owned (Do, 2017). 2 The Vietnamese trade union system comprises four levels: (1) VGCL at national level (whose leaders are chosen by the Part y); (2) provincial trade unions, and national sectoral trade unions (such as the Vietnam Garment and Textile Union); (3) upper level unions, local sectoral unions, industrial zone unions; and (4) enterprise-level unions. progressively higher minimum wage, social dialogue between management and workers, and collective bargaining. Why is this? To enhance our understanding of the politics of inclusive development, this paper explores why the Government of Vietnam has undertaken a series of pro-worker reforms. The paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 discusses key literatures. Section 2 outlines my qualitative research methodology. Drawing on these interviews, Section 3 traces the major drivers of industrial relations reform in Vietnam. Many in Government became anxious about regime stability due to widespread strikes. Manufactures are also keen to prevent strikes and appease reputation-conscious buyers. Reform was further incentivised by the Trans-Pacific Partnership's stipulation of Freedom of Association, together with economic and geopolitical incentives to join TPP. Donor-supported pilots have not motivated reform, but are nonetheless important: enabling reformists to explore new ideas, iteratively adapt, and garner evidence of what furthers their priorities, with which they can persuade anxious colleagues. These processes authorise experimentation and are used by coalitions to push for reform. At a higher level of abstraction, this paper connects the macro-and micro-drivers of political change by exploring how ...