Retrieval-induced forgetting is observed when the retrieval of target information causes the forgetting of nontarget information. The present study investigated whether similar dynamics occur in the context of generating arguments in the process of explanation. Participants studied arguments associated with several issues before attempting to think of new arguments pertaining to a subset of those issues. When given a later memory test, participants were less likely to recall the studied arguments if they had attempted to think of new arguments than if they had not. This argument-induced forgetting effect was observed regardless of whether participants attempted to generate arguments that either agreed or disagreed with the position of the arguments they studied. The effect was significantly reduced, however, and even numerically reversed, when participants generated arguments that were highly related to the studied arguments. This finding fits well with previous research on retrieval-induced forgetting, which has shown that the retrieval or generation of new information fails to cause the forgetting of old information when the two types of information are well integrated or semantically associated.Keywords Argument generation . Retrieval-induced forgetting . Retrieval-induced facilitation . Inhibition . Integration It often is while explaining our opinions that we find ourselves questioning, developing, and strengthening them. We may learn, for example, that the arguments we generate are not as convincing as we expected or that they rest on assumptions that are no longer valid. Alternatively, we may discover additional arguments that provide newfound support for our position, leading us to give it even more credence in the future than we would have otherwise. Research on self-persuasion, for example, has shown that attempting to generate new arguments in favor of a position can make people more likely to agree with that position than they would have been had they simply been exposed to the same arguments instead (Cialdini & Petty, 1981;Janis & King, 1954;King & Janis, 1956). Similarly, generating explanations for why an event might occur or why a theory might be true can cause people to judge them to be more likely to occur or be true (Campbell & Fairey, 1985;Hirt & Sherman, 1985;Hoch, 1985;Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, & Hirt, 1983).In the context of memory, the generation of new arguments and explanatory stances can enhance a person's ability to remember relevant information (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989;Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994;Crowley & Siegler, 1999;Murphy & Allopenna, 1994;Renkl, 1997;Rittle-Johnson, 2006;Ryoo & Linn 2012). When participants generate arguments or self-explanations related to categories or scientific phenomena, for example, they often remember relevant concepts better than they would have otherwise. Such consequences seem particularly tied to the way arguments and explanations are generated. Specifically, generations that involve referencing and elaborating...