Formal Foundations for Intel SGX Data Center Attestation Primitives

Sardar, Muhammad Usama; Faqeh, Rasha; Fetzer, Christof

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63406-3_16

Cited by 16 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…First, the client and server use the key exchange algorithm such as the Dife-Hellmann key exchange to negotiate the key of the asymmetric encryption algorithm, and then both communication parties use this key to encrypt messages for communication. After passing the Intel attestation service (IAS) verifcation, the client provides sensitive data to the server in digital copyright protection or approves the operation performed by the server by using the encryption channel established in the authentication process [32]. Please refer to documents [33] for more details about Intel SGX.…”

Section: Intel Sgxmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Privacy Protection Framework for Medical Image Security without Key Dependency Based on Visual Cryptography and Trusted Computing

Zhang

Ren

Shafiq

et al. 2023

Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The development of mobile Internet and the popularization of intelligent sensor devices greatly facilitate the generation and transmission of massive multimedia data including medical images and pathological models on the open network. The popularity of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies has greatly improved the efficiency of medical image recognition and diagnosis. However, it also poses new challenges to the security and privacy of medical data. The leakage of medical images related to users’ privacy is emerging one after another. The existing privacy protection methods based on cryptography or watermarking often bring a burden to image transmission. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving recognition network for medical images (called MPVCNet) to solve these problems. MPVCNet uses visual cryptography (VC) to transmit images by sharing. Benefiting from the secret-sharing characteristics of VC, MPVCNet can securely transmit images in clear text, which can both protect privacy and mitigate performance loss. Aiming at the problem that VC is easy to forge, we combine trusted computing environments (TEE) and blind watermarking technologies to embed verification information into sharing images. We further leverage the transfer learning technology to abate the side effect resulting from the use of visual cryptography. The results of the experiment show that our approach can maintain the trustworthiness and recognition performance of the recognition networks while protecting the privacy of medical images.

show abstract

Section: Intel Sgxmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Privacy Protection Framework for Medical Image Security without Key Dependency Based on Visual Cryptography and Trusted Computing

Zhang

Ren

Shafiq

et al. 2023

Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…CPSA was used for the analysis of EPID-based remote attestation [36]. In our previous work, we utilized ProVerif for the proof of confidentiality and integrity properties in EPID-based [18] as well as DCAPbased [19] remote attestation. ProVerif was also used for the verification of frameworks based on Intel SGX, such as [37].…”

Section: Symbolic Security Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ch can use the attestation-verification service to verify the Quote. This verification is based on the Data Center Attestation Primitives (DCAP) attestation mechanism [52], which has been independently formally verified in our recent work [19], and thus we skip the details here. After verification, it can analyze the static and runtime measurements as well as other configurations to make a decision whether to trust the TD.…”

Section: Formal Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Demystifying Attestation in Intel Trust Domain Extensions via Formal Verification

2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In August 2020, Intel asked the research community for feedback on the newly offered architecture extensions, called Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX), which give more control to Trust Domains (TDs) over processor resources. One of the key features of these extensions is the remote attestation mechanism, which provides a unified report verification mechanism for TDX and its predecessor Software Guard Extensions (SGX). Based on our experience and intuition, we respond to the request for feedback by formally specifying the attestation mechanism in the TDX using ProVerif's specification language. Although the TDX technology seems very promising, the process of formal specification reveals a number of subtle discrepancies in Intel's specifications that could potentially lead to design and implementation flaws. After resolving these discrepancies, we also present fully automated proofs that our specification of TD attestation preserves the confidentiality of the secret and authentication of the report by considering the state-of-the-art Dolev-Yao adversary in the symbolic model using ProVerif. We have submitted the draft to Intel, and Intel is in the process of making the changes.

show abstract

“…TDX also relies on Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [48] and Data Center Attestation Primitives (DCAP) [52] for remote attestation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intel TDX Demystified: A Top-Down Approach

Cheng¹,

Ozga²,

Valdez³

et al. 2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is a new architectural extension in the 4th Generation Intel Xeon Scalable Processor that supports confidential computing. TDX allows the deployment of virtual machines in the Secure-Arbitration Mode (SEAM) with encrypted CPU state and memory, integrity protection, and remote attestation. TDX aims to enforce hardware-assisted isolation for virtual machines and minimize the attack surface exposed to host platforms, which are considered to be untrustworthy or adversarial in the confidential computing's new threat model. TDX can be leveraged by regulated industries or sensitive data holders to outsource their computations and data with end-to-end protection in public cloud infrastructure. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of TDX to potential adopters, domain experts, and security researchers looking to leverage the technology for their own purposes. We adopt a top-down approach, starting with high-level security principles and moving to low-level technical details of TDX. Our analysis is based on publicly available documentation and source code, offering insights from security researchers outside of Intel.

show abstract

Formal Foundations for Intel SGX Data Center Attestation Primitives

Cited by 16 publications

References 24 publications

A Privacy Protection Framework for Medical Image Security without Key Dependency Based on Visual Cryptography and Trusted Computing

A Privacy Protection Framework for Medical Image Security without Key Dependency Based on Visual Cryptography and Trusted Computing

Demystifying Attestation in Intel Trust Domain Extensions via Formal Verification

Intel TDX Demystified: A Top-Down Approach

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About