Formal modelling and analysis of receipt-free auction protocols in applied pi

Dong, Naipeng; Jonker, Hugo; Pang, Jun

doi:10.1016/j.cose.2016.09.002

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 65 publications

(87 reference statements)

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“…Verification of stateful protocols has been noticed as important and necessary but challenging [5] even for a simple protocol as Example 1. In particular, ProVerif -one of the popular and widely used verifier (e.g., used in [7][8][9][10]), reports false attacks for some stateful protocols such as Example 1. Recently, an extension StatVerif is proposed, which is specialized in verifying stateful protocols [6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Verification Framework for Stateful Security Protocols

Dong

Pang

et al. 2017

Formal Methods and Software Engineering

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A long-standing research problem is how to efficiently verify security protocols with tamper-resistant global states, especially when the global states evolve unboundedly. We propose a protocol specification framework, which facilitates explicit modeling of states and state transformations. On the basis of that, we develop an algorithm for verifying security properties of protocols with unbounded state-evolving, by tracking state transformation and checking the validity of the state-evolving traces. We prove the correctness of the verification algorithm, implement both of the specification framework and the algorithm, and evaluate our implementation using a number of stateful security protocols. The experimental results show that our approach is both feasible and practically efficient. Particularly, we have found a security flaw on the digital envelope protocol, which cannot be detected with existing security protocol verifiers.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Verification Framework for Stateful Security Protocols

Dong

Pang

et al. 2017

Formal Methods and Software Engineering

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The Foul Adversary: Formal Models

Dong

Müller

2018

Formal Methods and Software Engineering

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In classical notions of privacy in computer security, users attempt to keep their data private. A user that is bribed, extorted or blackmailed (i.e., coerced ) may not do so. To get a general model of coercion, we strengthen the Dolev-Yao adversary with the ability to coerce others, to the foul adversary. We show that, depending on the setting, subtly di↵erent abilities should be assigned to the adversary -whereas existing approaches are one-size-fits-all. The variations of the foul adversary are formalised and we provide a hierarchical relation in their strength. We further interpret the adversary models using several examples.

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Observational equivalence and security games: Enhancing the formal analysis of security protocols

Cai,

et al. 2024

Computers & Security

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Formal modelling and analysis of receipt-free auction protocols in applied pi

Cited by 3 publications

References 65 publications

A Verification Framework for Stateful Security Protocols

A Verification Framework for Stateful Security Protocols

The Foul Adversary: Formal Models

Observational equivalence and security games: Enhancing the formal analysis of security protocols

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