Foundations of a we-perspective

Crone, Katja

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02834-6

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…It is helpful to start with the process of association by similarity, since it is largely uncontroversial that experiencing similar embodied experiences or states in self and other contributes to bringing about shared mental states ( Salmela, 2012 ; Zahavi, 2019 ; Salice and Miyazono, 2020 ; Crone, 2021 ). As a first example, consider early emotion sharing ( Tomasello, 2019 ).…”

Section: The Individuation Of Shared Mental Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Vincini

2023

Front. Psychol.

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Ordinary language in Western and non-Western cultures individuates shared mental states or experiences as unitary interpersonal events that belong to more than one individual. However, a default assumption in modern Western thought is that, in this regard, ordinary language is either illusory or merely metaphorical: a mental state or experience can belong to only one person. This assumption is called Cartesian eliminativism and is often taken to be foundational in psychology. It follows that any view that contradicts Cartesian eliminativism is a priori suspected of being “mysterious,” i.e., of not meeting scientific standards. This paper suggests that the very opposite may be the case. The straightforward view explains how individuals assemble and experience a shared mental state as a unitary whole whose components are distributed among the participants. The naturalistic advantages of such a view are brought to light by focusing on developmental science. Since it explains early shared emotions, goals, and attention merely by relying on domain-general, associative processes, the straightforward view is more parsimonious than current psychological theories. Indeed, it abandons the cumbersome postulates of (i) multi-level recursive mindreading and (ii) a special, conceptually elusive phenomenal quality. I outline the distinctive developmental predictions of the view and discuss how it accounts for the functions of shared mental states. As a reductionist, non-eliminativist approach, the straightforward view promises to be viable also for cognitive scientists who have so far worked within the Cartesian framework due to a lack of a rigorous and sufficiently developed alternative.

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Section: The Individuation Of Shared Mental Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 20 As Crone (2021 , p. 11819) puts it, "from a pragmatist perspective jointly shared meaning entails shared communicative aims." …”

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Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Vincini

2023

Front. Psychol.

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“…It suggests a form of group responsibility, but even that would be a deviant case, simply because the group in question does not fit the standard conditions for any type of group agency and responsibility. There is barely a joint context of action, no self-identification of an acting body or anything similar [8]. The only connection between the members of this liable group is some involvement with the product.…”

Section: The Different Answers To "Responsible In What Way?"mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Admittedly it is an as yet undecided question in philosophy whether moral rights or obligations of groups, which are firmly established in the legal context, have a moral equivalent that cannot be traced back to the rights and obligations of individual group members (cf. [8]).…”

Section: The Different Answers To "Who Is Responsible?"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Responsibility assignment won’t solve the moral issues of artificial intelligence

Heinrichs

2022

AI Ethics

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Who is responsible for the events and consequences caused by using artificially intelligent tools, and is there a gap between what human agents can be responsible for and what is being done using artificial intelligence? Both questions presuppose that the term ‘responsibility’ is a good tool for analysing the moral issues surrounding artificial intelligence. This article will draw this presupposition into doubt and show how reference to responsibility obscures the complexity of moral situations and moral agency, which can be analysed with a more differentiated toolset of moral terminology. It suggests that the impression of responsibility gaps only occurs if we gloss over the complexity of the moral situation in which artificial intelligent tools are employed and if—counterfactually—we ascribe them some kind of pseudo-agential status.

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“…This label ["plural subject"] should not be thought to have any ontological implications beyond those involved in the claim that certain persons are jointly committed in some 2 For general discussion of the we-perspective see Petersson 2017 andCrone 2020. My use of the notion is independent of their analyses.…”

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The We-Perspective on the Racing Sailboat

Egan

2022

Studies in Brain and Mind

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Racing in sailboats is for the most part a team sport, sailed in everything from two-person dinghies to super-maxi boats that require well over a dozen crew. Sailing is challenging enough but crewed racing boats present special challenges. Successful sports teams are able to adopt what is known as the we-perspective, forming intentions and making decisions, somewhat as a unified mind does, to achieve their goals. In this paper I consider what is involved in establishing and maintaining the we-perspective on a racing sailboat. 1 Gilbert's account of plural subjectsThere has been a lot of work in the last 30 years on collective intentionality, the phenomenon of treating complex systems, themselves composed of intentional agents, as subjects of propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Such group minds, as they are sometimes thought of, include corporations, clubs, religious organizations, military units, and more transient associations assembled for some immediate goal or purpose. Following standard usage in this literature I will call propositional attitudes ascribed to such collectives we-attitudes and the goals and intentions ascribed to them we-intentions. I will make use of Margaret Gilbert's well-known plural subjects theory (Gilbert 2006(Gilbert , 2009 in spelling out these notions.Her account provides a useful framework for introducing the notion of a plural subject, and the related notion of the we-perspective, though in the next section I will argue that it is inadequate to characterize the plural subject that is the racing sailboat. 1 Much of what I say will apply to crewed cruising sailing, but my interest in this paper is in sailing in the context of competition. 2Central to Gilbert's account of plural subjects is the notion of a joint commitment. She asks us to consider two individuals deciding to take a walk together. In doing so each takes on a commitment to act in a certain way. More precisely, here is how the joint commitment is created:In the basic case… each of two or more people must openly express his personal readiness jointly with the others to commit them all in a certain way. Once the concordant expressions of all have occurred and are common knowledge between the parties, the joint commitment is in place. (2009, 180) Non-basic cases "involve authorities whose status derives from a basic joint commitment." (180) Joint commitments, Gilbert says, give rise to a normative structure of obligations and entitlements. If A and B are jointly committed to take a walk, then each is thereby obligated to act in an appropriate way and each is entitled to expect and demand of the other that they also act accordingly. Each owes the other the appropriate action. As Gilbert puts it, the joint commitment establishes the following conditions: … one's being owed that action by [the other] prior to his performing it, one's being in a position to demand it of him prior to its performance, and one's being in a position to rebuke him if he has failed to perform it at the appropriate ti...

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Foundations of a we-perspective

Cited by 7 publications

References 53 publications

Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications

Responsibility assignment won’t solve the moral issues of artificial intelligence

The We-Perspective on the Racing Sailboat

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