Fractionating the unitary notion of dissociation: disembodied but not embodied dissociative experiences are associated with exocentric perspective-taking

Abstract

It has been argued that hallucinations which appear to involve shifts in egocentric perspective (e.g., the out-of-body experience, OBE) reflect specific biases in exocentric perspective-taking processes. Via a newly devised perspective-taking task, we examined whether such biases in perspective-taking were present in relation to specific dissociative anomalous body experiences (ABE) – namely the OBE. Participants also completed the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS; Sierra and Berrios, 2000) which provided measures of additional embodied ABE (unreality of self) and measures of derealization (unreality of surroundings). There were no reliable differences in the level of ABE, emotional numbing, and anomalies in sensory recall reported between the OBE and control group as measured by the corresponding CDS subscales. In contrast, the OBE group did provide significantly elevated measures of derealization (“alienation from surroundings” CDS subscale) relative to the control group. At the same time we also found that the OBE group was significantly more efficient at completing all aspects of the perspective-taking task relative to controls. Collectively, the current findings support fractionating the typically unitary notion of dissociation by proposing a distinction between embodied dissociative experiences and disembodied dissociative experiences – with only the latter being associated with exocentric perspective-taking mechanisms. Our findings – obtained with an ecologically valid task and a homogeneous OBE group – also call for a re-evaluation of the relationship between OBEs and perspective-taking in terms of facilitated disembodied experiences.

Predisposition to out-of-body experience (OBE) is associated with aberrations in multisensory integration: Psychophysiological support from a “rubber hand illusion” study.

“…In addition, it may well be that some of the anomalous-body experiences associated with DPD may also occur co-morbidly with the OBE -though the presence of OBEs suggests additional processes might also be present. Evidence for this assertion is that although high CDS scores can co-occur with predisposition to OBEs, having the OBE selectively enhances performance at an exocentric perspective-taking task (Braithwaite et al, 2013c;see Kessler & Braithwaite, 2016; for a more extensive discussion).…”

“…It is as yet unclear what these additional processes might be, but accounts of sharedbody representations being important for action and emotion, and disorders of bodyownership have been proposed within Bayesian / predictive coding frameworks (Ishida, Suzuki, & Grandi, 2015). In addition, exocentric representations / perspective-taking mechanisms are also an important part of spatial cognition and have shown associations with the occurrence of OBEs as well as having been argued to be important on theoretical grounds (Braithwaite & Dent, 2011;Braithwaite et al, 2013c, Kessler & Braithwaite, 2016 One potential puzzle is that given the OBE group scored high on measures of Depersonalization / Derealization (the CDS questionnaire), why didn't they show the same pattern as patients with DPD reported in the wider literature (i.e., a suppressed emotional response, not an enhanced one)? One possibility is that although the OBE group did score high on the CDS, this was only on two sub-scales of the measure -which suggests a more selective bias for those predisposed to OBEs.…”

“…Although such experiences can happen in association with psychopathology and neurological conditions (i.e., schizophrenia, epilepsy, migraine: Blackmore, 1986;Comfort, 1982;Critchley, 1950;Gabbard, Twemlow & Jones, 1982;Lippman, 1952;1953;Sacks, 1995;Siegel, 1977), they can also occur in the apparent complete absence of them (in non-clinical groups: Blackmore, 1982;Braithwaite & Dent, 2011;2014, Braithwaite, Mevorach, & Takahashi, 2015Easton, Blanke, & Mohr, 2009;Irwin, 1981;Murray & Fox, 2005;Twemlow, Gabbard & Jones, 1982). For non-clinical groups, hallucinatory OBEs have been associated with specific biases in exocentric perspective-taking, body-transformation processes and increased cortical hyperexcitability demonstrated via behavioural and brain-stimulation methods (Blackmore, 1987;Braithwaite, Broglia, Bagshaw, & Wilkins, 2013a;Braithwaite, et al, 2011a;2013b;2013c;Cook & Irwin, 1983). …”

“…For example, depersonalization-type experiences may well be dissociative but the experience of self remains within the physical body (Braithwaite et al, 2013c;Dewe, Watson & Braithwaite, 2016;Kessler & Braithwaite, 2016;Sierra & David, 2011;Sierra, 2009). In contrast, in the OBE, there is a shift in experiential perspective where the self is liberated from its physical shackles, and the differences between these forms of dissociative experience do appear to be associated with diverse neurocognitive biases (Braithwaite et al, 2013c;Kessler & Braithwaite, 2016).…”

Perspective Taking: building a neurocognitive framework for integrating the “social” and the “spatial”

“…Surtees and colleagues reveal that embodied egocentric transformations are used for visual as well as for spatial perspective taking, extending the generality of the embodied processing principle (Surtees et al, 2013). Braithwaite et al's contribution distinguishes between embodied and disembodied body-related hallucinations, showing that only the latter speeds up perspective taking (Braithwaite et al, 2013). Gardner and colleagues also highlight distinct processing routes towards perspective taking outcomes, where some individuals use embodied-while others use abstract (unembodied) calculation strategies (Gardner et al, 2013).…”