Framing effects in inference tasks—and why they are normatively defensible

Abstract

Framing effects occur when logically equivalent redescriptions of objects or outcomes lead to different behaviors, and, traditionally, such effects have been seen as irrational. However, recent evidence has shown that a speaker's choice among logically equivalent attribute frames can implicitly convey (or "leak") normatively relevant information about the speaker's reference point, among other things. In a reinterpretion of data published elsewhere, in this article it is shown that some common effects in inference tasks (covariation assessment and hypothesis testing) can also be seen as framing effects, thereby expanding the domain of framing. It is also shown that these framing effects are normatively defensible because normatively relevant information about event rarity is leaked through the description of data and through the phrasing of hypotheses, thereby broadening the information leakage approach to explaining framing effects. Information leakage can also explain why framing effects in such inference tasks disappear under certain conditions.

Correct acceptance weighs more than correct rejection: a decision bias induced by question framing

“…Our claim that the phrasing of a question could affect the setting of a decision criterion sits well with the work on framing effects by McKenzie and his co-workers (McKenzie, 2004;McKenzie & Nelson, 2003;Sher & McKenzie, 2006). McKenzie and his co-workers point out that logically equivalent phrasings may not be information-equivalent; that normatively relevant information can be leaked via the experimenter's choice among logically equivalent frames.…”

“…The phrasing thus provides subtle cues about the payoff structure that may go beyond those explicitly stated. However, it should be noted that McKenzie's own work (2004;Sher & McKenzie, 2006), as well as his reinterpretation of other work involving the detection of covariation and hypothesis testing (e.g., McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2000, 2007Oaksford & Chater, 1994, suggests that the phrasing chosen in everyday tasks indicates the rare, rather than the more common values. In contrast, we hypothesize that the phrasing is taken to indicate the value of interest, leading people to act as if that value is more common, not rarer.…”

Comparing two tiny giants or two huge dwarfs? Preference reversals owing to number size framing

“…It is also worth to note the potential connection between information leakage account of framing effects (McKenzie, 2004;McKenzie & Nelson, 2003) and the findings in the present study. Specifically, Mckenzie and Nelson (2003) have argued that (a) speakers might intentionally frame options in a way that can be informative to listeners, and (b) listeners appear to be aware of speakers' preference from how the options are framed.…”

The conjunction fallacy and the many meanings of and

“…In contrast, to winnow out the inappropriate readings of ambiguous words and statements, to infer the referents of pronouns and the meanings of polysemous words, and to fill in intended interpretations of what has been said is evidence of the remarkable linguistic abilities of humans. The juxtaposition is ironic: Whereas many judgment and decision-making researchers continue to interpret the outcome of semantic and pragmatic inferences as evidence of human irrationality (but for a very different view see McKenzie, 2004;Sher & McKenzie, 2006), legions of computer scientists, linguists, mathematicians, engineers, and psychologists struggle to design artificial agents capable of making exactly those inferences. To many of those scientists, designing systems that can ''process language as skillfully as we do will signal the arrival of truly intelligent machines" (Jurafsky & Martin, 2000, p. 6).…”