2008
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.06.008
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The conjunction fallacy and the many meanings of and

Abstract: a b s t r a c tAccording to the conjunction rule, the probability of A and B cannot exceed the probability of either single event. This rule reads and in terms of the logical operator^, interpreting A and B as an intersection of two events. As linguists have long argued, in natural language ''and" can convey a wide range of relationships between conjuncts such as temporal order (''I went to the store and bought some whisky"), causal relationships (''Smile and the world smiles with you"), and can indicate a col… Show more

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Cited by 105 publications
(66 citation statements)
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“…(p. 92) In natural language, terms such as and and probability often have multiple meanings and meanings that are different from mathematical probability and the logi-cal and. If, in addition, conversational maxims (Grice, 1989) employed to disambiguate lexical and pragmatic ambiguities suggest that probability does not mean mathematical probability and and does not mean the logical operator, then violations of the conjunctions would be a reflection of sound and intelligent semantic and pragmatic inferences (see Hertwig, Benz, & Krauss, 2008;Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; but see also Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001;Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002). On this view, the conjunction fallacy, and possibly several other cognitive illusions (Hilton, 1995) are not due to cognitive limits.…”
Section: Norms Of Social Rationality: Content-and Context-dependentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(p. 92) In natural language, terms such as and and probability often have multiple meanings and meanings that are different from mathematical probability and the logi-cal and. If, in addition, conversational maxims (Grice, 1989) employed to disambiguate lexical and pragmatic ambiguities suggest that probability does not mean mathematical probability and and does not mean the logical operator, then violations of the conjunctions would be a reflection of sound and intelligent semantic and pragmatic inferences (see Hertwig, Benz, & Krauss, 2008;Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; but see also Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001;Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002). On this view, the conjunction fallacy, and possibly several other cognitive illusions (Hilton, 1995) are not due to cognitive limits.…”
Section: Norms Of Social Rationality: Content-and Context-dependentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kahneman 1982, 1983;Gigerenzer 1996;Kahneman and Tversky 1996;Hertwig 1997;Hertwig and Chase 1998;Hertwig and Gigerenzer 1999;Mellers et al 2001;Stolarz-Fantino et al 2003;Bonini et al 2004;Tentori et al 2004;Hertwig et al 2008;Moro 2009;Kahneman 2011;Erceg and Galic 2014; for a review, cf. Moro 2009).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Hertwig et al (2008), an overview is given of different arguments that attempt to show that the use of the 'AND' operator in ordinary language is different from the 'AND' operator used in propositional logic. Such arguments would lead us to conclude that the 'and' in 'Linda is a bank teller and a feminist' would be different from the corresponding logical operator and so no fallacy arises.…”
Section: What Walter Tells Us About Lindamentioning
confidence: 99%