2013
DOI: 10.1007/s11225-013-9528-x
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Free Quantified Epistemic Logics

Abstract: The paper presents an epistemic logic with quantification over agents of knowledge and with a syntactical distinction between de re and de dicto occurrences of terms. Knowledge de dicto is characterized as 'knowledge that', and knowlegde de re as 'knowledge of'. Transition semantics turns out to be an adequate tool to account for the distinctions introduced.

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Cited by 17 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…¬Rc, 0 occurs on our branch above, while B x 1 Dx 2 [c, c/x 1 , x 2 ], 0 (that is, B c Dc, 0) does not occur on this 3. However, see Fitting et al (2001) and Corsi and Orlandelli (2013). 4.…”
Section: Examples Of Derivations In Our Systems the Unmarried Teachementioning
confidence: 99%
“…¬Rc, 0 occurs on our branch above, while B x 1 Dx 2 [c, c/x 1 , x 2 ], 0 (that is, B c Dc, 0) does not occur on this 3. However, see Fitting et al (2001) and Corsi and Orlandelli (2013). 4.…”
Section: Examples Of Derivations In Our Systems the Unmarried Teachementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, agents cannot have uncertainty about each other's identity. A natural extension is to allow (implicit) quantification over agents (Corsi, 2002;Corsi and Orlandelli, 2013;Corsi and Tassi, 2014), where different readings of a quantified modal formula can also be disambiguated. Another quantifying-over-agent approach appears in the context of rough sets with multiple sources (as agents) by Khan and Banerjee (2010).…”
Section: Recent Technical Advances Of Quantified Epistemic Logicmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, a may not know that 'b' is the name of the maintenance robot, thus merely knowing b knows a needs help is not enough for a to be sure it will be helped. The authors of [4] list several possible readings of (⋆), which we will elaborate as follows: a, the broken robot, knows that (i) the robot named 'b' knows that the robot named 'a' needs help, or (ii) the robot named 'b' knows that it, i.e. the broken robot, needs help, or (iii) the maintenance robot knows that the robot named 'a' needs help, or (iv) the maintenance robot knows that it, i.e.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is impossible to distinguish the above readings in standard epistemic logic. In the literature [8,7,4,5,11], various approaches are proposed. In [7], Grove correctly pinpoints the problems of scope and manner of reference in giving various de re /de dicto readings for higher-order knowledge, and proposes a new semantics for 2-sorted first-order modal logic that is based on world-agent pairs, so as to cope with indexicals like "me".…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%