Free riders: the economics and organization of outlaw motorcycle gangs

Piano, Ennio E.

doi:10.1007/s11127-017-0437-9

Cited by 22 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…One consequence of the deepening involvement in criminal affairs was the adoption of a new national and international governance structure to consolidate a club’s control over its territory (and the economic opportunities that come with it) by violent means (Piano, 2017). This has led to a 30-year period of conflict, starting with the violence between the Hells Angels and the Mongols over the control of Southern California in the 1970s, to the “biker wars” of the 1990s between the Hells Angels and the Outlaws in Canada—conflict which led to death of at least 60 people, including two civilians—and between the former and the Bandidos in the Scandinavian countries (Barker, 2010; Quinn and Forsyth, 2009).…”

Section: Outlaw Bikers: a Brief Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first is the analytical literature on North American OMGs. This literature is summarized in Barker (2010), Lauchs et al (2015), and Piano (2017). The second is the literature on the economics of organizations operating at the margin of mainstream society and organized crime (Skaperdas, 2001), along the lines of Leeson’s (2007, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) work on 18th-century pirates and Skarbek’s (2010, 2011, 2012) work on North American prison gangs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Outlaw and economics: Biker gangs and club goods

Piano

2017

Rationality and Society

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Today, outlaw motorcycle gangs are best known for their involvement in an international criminal network dealing in narcotics, human trafficking, and arms smuggling. Law enforcement agencies in three continents have identified groups like the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, the Outlaws Motorcycle Club, and the Bandidos Motorcycle Club as a major threat to public safety. Before their descent into organized crime, outlaw bikers captured the imagination of the American public due to their peculiar look and outrageous behavior. They dressed in dirty sleeveless leather jackets and Nazi paraphernalia, their arms covered in tattoos of Nazi and White-supremacist symbolism. They drove highly customized, loud, and heavy American bikes-almost always Harley-Davidsons-and despised Japanese vehicles. They were notorious for their erratic behavior, in particular, the propensity to use violence in an idiosyncratic way when interacting with non-bikers and the public display of nudity and sexual practices. Unlike standard treatments of outlaw bikers, which draw from criminology, sociology, and psychology, I propose an explanation for these seemingly irrational and certainly odd practices rooted on the economic approach. Following the literature on the economic theory of religious sects, I argue that these odd practices served as effective obstacles to the ability of outlaw bikers to free ride on the club goods provided by these organizations.

show abstract

Section: Outlaw Bikers: a Brief Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Outlaw and economics: Biker gangs and club goods

Piano

2017

Rationality and Society

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The organized crime literature also supports the claim that hierarchy plays a very pivotal role in the network structures of criminal markets and is an appropriate component of analysis (Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000; Piano, 2017). Numerous studies suggest that criminal organizations are already embedded into preexisting societal hierarchies, and thus have some level of hierarchical structure themselves (Akerlof and Yellen, 1994; Jankowski, 1991; Spergel, 1995).…”

Section: Markets and Hierarchiesmentioning

confidence: 78%

“…Leeson (2007, 2009, 2010) finds that some criminal organizations are so sophisticated as to have checks and balances in a constitutionally constrained democratic government like pirates did in the 1900s. Piano (2017), in his research on the Hell's Angels motorcycle club, finds that this criminal organization has been successful because of its hierarchical organization. This network structured has allowed it to mitigate internal conflict while expanding and profiting from its illegal activities.…”

Section: Markets and Hierarchiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shadow markets and hierarchies: comparing and modeling networks in the Dark Net

Norgaard¹,

Walbert

Hardy

2018

Journal of Institutional Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper analyzes the determinants of network structure, as measured by hierarchy and monopolization, by examining various black market networks. We examine structures of networks on the Internet Dark Net (Virtual) and compare it to network structures of traditional black markets (Ground), using agent-based modeling. The purpose of modeling these two different types of illicit markets is to understand the network structure that emerges from the interactions of the agents in each environment. Traditional black markets are relatively hierarchical, with high degree and high betweenness. We compare the density and average length of the shortest path of the simulated Ground black market networks with our simulated Virtual network. We find that hierarchy and monopolization tendencies in networks are products of different transaction costs and information asymmetries. The Internet is an effective way to lower multiple aspects of network structure. We observe that the network structure surrounding the interactions in the Virtual black market is less hierarchical and slightly more monopolistic than the network structure of the Ground market.

show abstract

“…Leeson (2012a, 2012b) shows the role of superstition as an enforcement mechanism for property rights in Medieval Europe. Finally, Piano (2017, 2018) studies the property rights arrangements within Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Desertion as theft

Piano

Rouanet

2019

Journal of Institutional Economics

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

To be effective, an army must contain the extent of desertion among its ranks. This phenomenon rose to particular prominence in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries, with the appearance of the figure of the “citizen-soldier” on the battlefield. This paper offers the first theoretical treatment of the issue of desertion from an economic perspective. Building on the work of Yoram Barzel on the “economic analysis of property rights,” we develop a “desertion as theft” framework. We then test the empirical implications of the framework against qualitative and quantitative evidence from Napoleonic France.

show abstract

Free riders: the economics and organization of outlaw motorcycle gangs

Cited by 22 publications

References 32 publications

Outlaw and economics: Biker gangs and club goods

Outlaw and economics: Biker gangs and club goods

Shadow markets and hierarchies: comparing and modeling networks in the Dark Net

Desertion as theft

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About