2011
DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwr028
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'Free us up so we can be responsible!' The co-evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility and neo-liberalism in the UK, 1977-2010

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Cited by 204 publications
(193 citation statements)
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References 21 publications
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“…Voluntary product labeling and certification schemes often associated with neoliberalism, such a "sweat free" apparel, "fair trade" food products, and "sustainably harvested" lumber are clear and well-theorized examples of private regulation (Bartley 2007;Guthman 2007;Vogel 2008;Kinderman 2011;Besky 2013;Locke 2013). These institutions indirectly 'coerce' actors-often firms-into complying with particular standards or practices not by issuing direct authoritative commands and threatening penalties, but because a "market for virtue" (Vogel 2005) and the moral status of particular exchanges (Fourcade and Healy 2007) creates indirect, structuralcontextual incentives for compliance, including reputational and status benefits for firms, higher profit margins, and the possibility of staving off more authoritative forms of state-led regulation (Walker and Rea 2014;Kaplan 2015).…”
Section: [Figure 5 About Here]mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Voluntary product labeling and certification schemes often associated with neoliberalism, such a "sweat free" apparel, "fair trade" food products, and "sustainably harvested" lumber are clear and well-theorized examples of private regulation (Bartley 2007;Guthman 2007;Vogel 2008;Kinderman 2011;Besky 2013;Locke 2013). These institutions indirectly 'coerce' actors-often firms-into complying with particular standards or practices not by issuing direct authoritative commands and threatening penalties, but because a "market for virtue" (Vogel 2005) and the moral status of particular exchanges (Fourcade and Healy 2007) creates indirect, structuralcontextual incentives for compliance, including reputational and status benefits for firms, higher profit margins, and the possibility of staving off more authoritative forms of state-led regulation (Walker and Rea 2014;Kaplan 2015).…”
Section: [Figure 5 About Here]mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a result, firms are expected to be better equipped to identify and acknowledge strategic opportunities within their environments because of the absence of social and environmental restraints imposed by government (Kinderman, 2012;Vallentin and Murillo, 2012). However, the consequences of these macro-level principles at the micro level (i.e., at the level of individuals rather than firms) are rarely discussed in the CSR literature, reflecting the more general tendency in the CSR literature not to address CSR as thoroughly with respect to organizational policies.…”
Section: What Responsibilization Is Aboutmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Contemporary literature identifies a national political-economic context to CSR strategy by investigating the effect of national variation on selections of firms that occupy positions in corporate best practice rankings of CSR activities, issue sustainability reports or participate in CSR-focused business associations (Aguilera et al, 2006;Gjolberg, 2009;Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010;Kang and Moon, 2011;Kinderman, 2009Kinderman, , 2011Maignan and Ralston, 2002;Midttun, et al 2006;Steen Knudsen and Brown, 2011). These national varieties accordingly signify different versions of capitalism that vary with regard to such characteristics as industrial relations, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and state intervention in the economy.…”
Section: The Debate On the National Embedding Of Csr Policies So Far:mentioning
confidence: 99%