The article examines the effects of non-financial disclosure (NFD) on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We conceptualise trade-offs between two ideal types (government regulation and business self-regulation) in relation to CSR. Whereas self-regulation is associated with greater flexibility for businesses to develop best practices, it can also lead to complacency if firms feel no external pressure to engage with CSR. In contrast, government regulation is associated with greater stringency around minimum standards, but can also result in rigidity owing to a 'one size fits all' approach. Given these potential trade-offs, we ask how mandatory non-financial disclosure has been shaping CSR practices and examine its potential effectiveness as a regulatory instrument. Our analysis of 24 OECD countries using the Asset4 database shows that firms in countries that require non-financial disclosure adopt significantly more CSR activities. However, we also find that NFD regulation does not lead to lower levels of corporate irresponsibility. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates that, over time, the variation in CSR activities declines as firms adopt increasingly similar practices. Our study thereby contributes to understanding the impact of government regulation on CSR at firm level. We also discuss the limits of mandatory NFD in addressing regulatory trade-offs between stringency and flexibility in the field of corporate social responsibility.

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This article contributes to the debate on employer preferences. It challenges varieties of capitalism's argument that manufacturing employers in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) will tend to defend non-liberal institutions because of the comparative institutional advantage that they provide. It examines Germany and Sweden, two critical cases in this debate. It is based on interviews with key officials and an in-depth examination of the Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (INSM) and Timbro, think-tanks sponsored by German and Swedish employers to shape public opinion. In line with power resource theory, I find that both German and Swedish employers have a strong preference for liberalization. In both cases, they responded to left-wing threats, institutional constraints and situations of 'crisis' by launching a counteroffensive and promoting welfare state reform, labor market flexibility and deregulation. Employers have used discourse as a power resource to pursue an aggressive liberalizing agenda and to attack institutions that required active deregulation on the part of the state. Whether employers in CMEs seek to dismantle existing institutions altogether or soften and reengineer these institutions from within, one thing is clear: their use of radical neoliberal discourse is incompatible with the claim that they defend traditional institutions in any meaningful sense.

In recent years, scholars and policymakers have become interested in the idea of a smart mix of voluntary and regulatory measures in private governance. If public and private actors are to share the work load of governing the commons, this presupposes that both sides can agree on this compromise formula-but can they? So far, we have limited knowledge of firms and business associations' regulatory preferences in this realm. As a ground-clearing exercise my article aims to help fill this gap and expose some of the underappreciated fault and conflict lines within private governance. Its thrust is that existing literature is excessively optimistic about business's willingness to support regulation. The article surveys the EU's non-financial disclosure Directive and half a dozen other attempts to regulate CSR or non-financial disclosure across the world, and finds that public authorities' more ambitious attempts at regulation met with vigorous business opposition. Even after the financial crisis, most business associations and firms reject a smart mix in favor of voluntarism and soft law without hard sanctions.

What are the prospects for the upward harmonization of regulatory standards, and why do governments support or oppose more stringent supranational regulation? To answer these questions, this paper examines an important case of upward regulatory harmonization, the European Union's non-financial disclosure Directive 2014/95/EU, which requires large firms to report on their social, environmental, and human rights impacts. In spite of favorable circumstances, the Directive's opponents watered down the Commission's proposal during the course of the negotiations. Upward regulatory harmonization is difficult because of the adjustment costs it imposes on the private sector. The paper provides an in-depth analysis of countries' positions in the negotiations: Germany was the most hardline opponent, France the strongest supporter, and the United Kingdom was somewhere inbetween. For most countries, private sector adjustment costs determine government support and opposition for upward harmonization at the supranational level, but the analysis shows that partisan politics and varieties of capitalism also matter.