Frequency diverse array beamforming for physical-layer security with directionally-aligned legitimate user and eavesdropper

Lin, Jie; Li, Qiang; Yang, Jun

doi:10.23919/eusipco.2017.8081593

Cited by 12 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…For simplicity, we only consider the directional LoS channel since the multipath components (MPCs) are very few and relatively weak in mmWave transmission [21], [22], [29], [30], which can be ignored. This assumption is acceptable in LoS mmWave communications because the MPCs are often attenuated by 20dB as compared to the LoS component [27], [28], [31].…”

Section: B System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These FAB methods achieve excellent PLS performance when the eavesdropper locates in the sidelobe direction. More recently, a frequency diverse array (FDA) [27], [28] is proposed to address the PLS problem when the legitimate user and eavesdropper are both located in the same direction pointed by the mainlobe with FAB. More specifically, an interesting rotated angular beamforming (RAB) scheme is proposed with FDA, where the resultant mainlobe can circumvent a well-localized eavesdropper via frequencydiverse beampattern synthesis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fixed Region Beamforming Using Frequency Diverse Subarray for Secure mmWave Wireless Communications

Hong

Jing

Gao

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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Millimeter-wave (mmWave) using conventional phased array (CPA) enables highly directional and fixed angular beamforming (FAB), therefore enhancing physical layer security (PLS) in the angular domain. However, as the eavesdropper is located in the direction pointed by the mainlobe of the informationcarrying beam, information leakage is inevitable and FAB cannot guarantee PLS performance. To address this threat, we propose a novel fixed region beamforming (FRB) by employing a frequency diverse subarray (FDSA) architecture to enhance the PLS performance for mmWave directional communications. In particular, we carefully introduce multiple frequency offset increments (FOIs) across subarrays to achieve a sophisticated beampattern synthesis that ensures a confined information transmission only within the desired angle-range region (DARR) in close vicinity of the target user. More specifically, we formulate the secrecy rate maximization problem with FRB over possible subarray FOIs, and consider two cases of interests, i.e., without/with the location information of eavesdropping, both turn out to be NPhard. For the unknown eavesdropping location case, we propose a seeker optimization algorithm to minimize the maximum sidelobe peak of the beampattern outside the DARR. As for the known eavesdropping location case, a block coordinate descend linear approximation algorithm is proposed to minimize the sidelobe level in the eavesdropping region. By using the proposed FRB, the mainlobes of all subarrays are constructively superimposed in the DARR while the sidelobes are destructively overlayed outside the DARR. Therefore, FRB takes prominent effect on confining information transmission within the DARR. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed FDSA-based FRB can provide superior PLS performance over the CPA-based FAB.Index Terms-Frequency diverse subarray (FDSA), fixed region beamforming (FAB), angle, range, frequency offset increment (FOI), physical layer security (PLS), secrecy rate (SR).

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Section: B System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fixed Region Beamforming Using Frequency Diverse Subarray for Secure mmWave Wireless Communications

Hong

Jing

Gao

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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“…By jointly optimizing the active transmit beamforming of Alice and the passive reflect beamforming at the IRS, the secrecy rate for Bob can be maximized. In order to achieve PLS for directionally-aligned Alice, Eve and Bob in the mainlobe path, some angle-range-dependent transmit beamforming schemes [10][11][12][13] are proposed to discriminate Bob and Eve in the target direction. The work in [10] proposes a location-based PLS technique for vehicular networks in mmWave communication by exploiting the large dimensional antenna arrays and the ground-reflected path to achieve angle-range-dependent transmission and sidelobe randomization.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The work in [10] proposes a location-based PLS technique for vehicular networks in mmWave communication by exploiting the large dimensional antenna arrays and the ground-reflected path to achieve angle-range-dependent transmission and sidelobe randomization. The works in [11,12] propose a frequency diverse phased-array (FDPA) beamforming approach to achieve PLS for proximal or aligned target user and well-localization eavesdropper. The work in [13] proposes an optimal FDPA directional modulation with artificial noise (AN) scheme to decouple the angle-range correlation and maximize the secrecy rate (SR) of Bob.In this paper, we propose a novel dynamic rotated angular beamforming (DRAB) to address the challenge of PLS in the CAB by exploiting the frequency degree of freedom (DoF) of FDPA.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dynamic Rotated Angular Beamforming Using Frequency Diverse Phased-Array for Secure MmWave Wireless Communications

Hong

Jing

et al. 2019

Electronics

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In this paper, we propose a new secure millimeter-wave wireless communication architecture called dynamic rotated angular beamforming (DRAB), to address the physical layer security (PLS) challenge for aligned transmitter, eavesdropper and target receiver in the mainlobe path, where the conventional angular beamforming (CAB) fails to provide satisfactory PLS performance. The proposed DRAB consists of a conventional phased-array and a set of frequency offset modulator. A frequency offset increment (FOI) set is intentionally introduced to control the dynamic rotation of DRAB's mainlobe around the target user in the angle-range space. Thus, the average sidelobe of DRAB outside the target region is suppressed dramatically while the mainlobe inside the target region is a constant. We consider two cases of interests, i.e., with/without the location information of eavesdropping. For the known eavesdropping case, DRAB steer the zero gain sidelobes towards eavesdropper. The secrecy rate maximization problem is simplified to a form only depending on the FOI. As for the unknown eavesdropping case, we mainly depends on the beam rotating dynamically and randomly to hide the mainlobe path. Moreover, we propose inverted antenna subset technique to further randomize the sidelobes against sensitive eavesdropping. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed DRAB can provide superior PLS performance over the existing CAB.Keywords: frequency diverse phased-array; dynamic rotated angular beamforming; frequency offset increment; physical layer security; secrecy rate IntroductionThe broadcast nature of wireless medium makes wireless systems vulnerable to eavesdropping. Recently, physical layer security (PLS) technique which is an information theoretic method to achieving secure wireless communications without upper-layer encryptions has received more and more attentions [1][2][3][4]. Sidelobe suppression and sidelobe randomization are the popular PLS approaches [5][6][7][8] in transmit beamforming, which provide satisfactory secure performance by decreasing and jamming eavesdropper's reception while keeping target user's (Bob's) reception constant. If an eavesdropper (Eve) locates in the sidelobe angle sector, PLS can be achieved easily. Especially in band above millimeter-wave (mmWave), the highly directional transmit beamforming makes information leakage in the sidelobe region almost negligible. However, as conventional angular beamforming (CAB) is only angle-dependent beampattern, the transmitter (Alice) can not discriminate Bob and Eve with different range in the same target direction. Thus, these PLS approaches may fail in the challenge scenario where the channels of Eve and Bob are highly correlated and the path-loss of Eve is weaker than Bob. As shown in Figure 1, only if Eve captures the fixed mainlobe direction of CAB and moves in the beam direction, confidential information leakage is inevitable. AliceBob Eve CAB DRAB DRAB Rotation Figure 1. Conventional angular beamforming (CAB)'s physical layer security (PLS) fails f...

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Physical Layer Security in an OFDM Time Reversal SISO Communication With Imperfect Channel State Information

et al. 2022

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A frequency domain time-reversal (TR) precoder is proposed to perform physical layer security in single-input single-output (SISO) systems using orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) and artificial noise (AN) injection. This scheme guarantees the secrecy of a communication towards a legitimate user, Bob, by exploiting the frequency diversity selective behaviour in multipath channels. The transmitter, Alice, has imperfect channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate link thanks to the channel reciprocity in time division duplex systems and does not know the instantaneous CSI of a potential eavesdropper, Eve. Three optimal decoding structures at Eve are considered in a block fading environment depending on the handshake procedure between Alice and Bob. Closed-form approximations of the signal-to-noise ratio required at Bob and the maximal CSI error that can be made at Alice, in order to guarantee a communication ergodic secrecy rate (ESR), are derived. Furthermore, the optimal amount of AN energy to inject, considering imperfect CSI, is also given as a closed-form expression. A trade-off on the choice of the spreading factor of the TR precoder is established between maximizing the ESR and decreasing the −achievable secrecy rate. Finally, thanks to these results, Alice can be a priori aware of the ESR over which she can establish a secure communication.INDEX TERMS Artificial noise, block-fading, eavesdropper, ergodic secrecy rate, physical layer security, −achievable secrecy rate , SISO-OFDM, time division duplex , time-reversal.

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Frequency diverse array beamforming for physical-layer security with directionally-aligned legitimate user and eavesdropper

Cited by 12 publications

References 15 publications

Fixed Region Beamforming Using Frequency Diverse Subarray for Secure mmWave Wireless Communications

Fixed Region Beamforming Using Frequency Diverse Subarray for Secure mmWave Wireless Communications

Dynamic Rotated Angular Beamforming Using Frequency Diverse Phased-Array for Secure MmWave Wireless Communications

Physical Layer Security in an OFDM Time Reversal SISO Communication With Imperfect Channel State Information

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