Friendship and Animals, Again: A Response to Fröding and Peterson

Rowlands, Jonathan

doi:10.5406/janimalethics.1.2.0190

Cited by 3 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…While this line of thought may at first glance look like a simple restatement of Fröding and Peterson's (2011a) initial position, at one point of the argument Rowlands (2011) intimates that Aristotle was committed to this view not only because animals are deprived of the complex cognitive apparatus that make such forms of friendship possible, as suggested by Fröding and Peterson (2011a), but rather because our attitudes toward animals, as reported by Aristotle, simply preclude this possibility. Thus, in commenting on a passage of the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 2000 where we learn that we cannot become friends with an ox, a horse, or a slave on the grounds that we have nothing in common with such "tools with soul," Rowlands (2011) notes:…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 87%

“…Does this argument stand up? Rowlands (2011) does not think so. The most penetrating of his objections is leveled at the logical structure of Fröding and Peterson's (2011a) reasoning.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 98%

“…An obligation of this kind would actually contradict the very nature of friendship understood as a voluntary and unconstrained social bond. It is for this reason, Rowlands (2011) observes, that friendship can only give rise to conditional obligations rather than categorical ones (p. 73). That is to say, only if A is friend of B can we infer that A has certain obligations toward B as a friend.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In recent years, this journal has become the main venue for a stimulating debate on the possibility of animal ethics based on friendship. The question was first raised by Barbro Fröding and Martin Peterson (2011a), who received a critical response from Mark Rowlands (2011) in the same journal issue. In the second issue of the Journal of Animal Ethics published that year, Fröding and Peterson (2011b) wrote a short but eloquent reply to Rowlands where they addressed some of his main objections.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Animal Ethics Based on Friendship: An Aristotelian Perspective

Torres

2022

Journal of Animal Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article examines Aristotle's views concerning the possibility of friendship between human beings and nonhuman animals. The suggestion that he denies this possibility is rejected. I reassess the textual evidence adduced by scholars in support of this reading, while adding new material for discussion. Central to the traditional reading is the assumption that animals, in Aristotle's view, cannot be friends in virtue of their cognitive limitations. I argue that Aristotle's account of animal cognition is perfectly consistent with the possibility of friendship between human beings and nonhuman animals.

show abstract

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 87%

“…Does this argument stand up? Rowlands (2011) does not think so. The most penetrating of his objections is leveled at the logical structure of Fröding and Peterson's (2011a) reasoning.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Animal Ethics Based on Friendship: An Aristotelian Perspective

Torres

2022

Journal of Animal Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The British philosopher Mark Rowlands (Rowlands 2011) acknowledges that in Aristotle's work there can be no question of true friendship between man and animal, because animals lack the ability necessary for true friendship. But according to Rowlands, Aristotle pays insufficient attention to the typical nature of the human-animal relationship, and fails to acknowledge the admittedly different but not for that reason inferior friendships that can exist between humans and animals.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Wolf and the Animal Lover

Drenthen¹

2016

The International Library of Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For Aristotle a true friendship can only exist between free human beings, because true friendship is based on a shared understanding of the good. Yet today, some animal philosophers argue that friendships can exist between humans and animals, maybe not in Aristotle's sense of the word but in another way, that appreciates how animals are different from us humans, yet also share a certain commonality. Usually, these reflections on humananimal friendship concern human relations with domestic animals, notably pets. But can we befriend wild predators: those animals that by their very nature can be dangerous to us? In this paper, I examine what it might mean to befriend a wild animal, and whether it would be possible to be friends with wild wolves. I will argue that any friendly relation with wild animals will consists of a paradoxical combination of benevolent involvement and loving detachment. 1. Friendships between humans and animals Many people today are convinced that friendships between people and animals are possible. That thought is relatively new, especially in philosophy. According to Aristotle, true friendship can only exist between two free citizens, because according to him friendship consists of a conscious form of mutual benevolence. 1 Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship: friendship is based on mutual benefit, or friendship is based on the pleasure that friends derive from being in each other's company, but in friendships of the third kind, true friendship, mutual benefit and enjoyment go together with a third factor, namely a mutual admiration for the moral qualities of the other. Real friends wish each other the best because they see the other for what they are. And since only humans have the ability to recognize moral virtues in one another, for Aristotle a true friendship can only exist between free people. Yet today, some animal philosophers argue that friendships do exist between humans and animals, maybe not in the true sense of the word but in a weaker version. 2 It is indeed difficult to deny 1 Friendship with a slave is impossible, according to Aristotle, insofar as he is a slave. 'Qua slave one cannot be friends with him; but qua man one can.' (Nicomachean Ethics, 1161 b5). 2 For example, see the article 'Animal Ethics Based on Friendship' by Barbro Fröding and Martin Peterson in the first issue of the Journal of Animal Ethics (Fröding and Peterson 2011). Fröding and Peterson believe that recognition of the mutual benefits that pets and their owners from each other is enough to base a friendship on.

show abstract

In praise of animals

Borchert,

Dewey

2023

Biol Philos

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Friendship and Animals, Again: A Response to Fröding and Peterson

Cited by 3 publications

References 3 publications

Animal Ethics Based on Friendship: An Aristotelian Perspective

Animal Ethics Based on Friendship: An Aristotelian Perspective

The Wolf and the Animal Lover

In praise of animals

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About