This article investigates the complex relationship between federalism and electoral authoritarianism by making an empirical inquiry into the structure of incentives that shaped the reform of Russia's regional election laws in [2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009]. The idea behind the reform was to make the incumbent governors more manageable and more dependent on the federal authorities. However, the process of its practical implementation largely coincided with Russia's transition to electoral authoritarianism, as a result of which this original intention was reversed by endowing regional authorities with an unrestricted effective power to determine the course of the reform. The main hypothesis of this study is that bounded only by the reform framework, the governors exerted their influence to maximize one of their main assets, the loyalty of the regional assembles. In order to substantiate this hypothesis empirically, a model formalizing the governors' optimization problem is constructed, its possible implications are discussed and their statistical support is examined. The results obtained support the theory according to which electoral authoritarianism, rather than simply suppressing the autonomy of most powerful subnational actors, incorporates them by expanding their effective control over the regional political arenas. The previously existing federal arrangements are instrumental in pursuing this goal.