From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations Transition to Political Parties

Acosta, Benjamin

doi:10.1017/s0022381614000188

Cited by 40 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…92 Acosta finds that more permissive electoral systems do not entice militant groups to transition to political parties. 93 Focusing on terrorist groups, Brathwaite finds no evidence that the electoral system makes a difference for electoral participation. 94 This is a reminder that not all terrorist groups are amenable to political inclusion and that some simply prefer bullets over ballots.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kinder, Gentler, Safer? A Re-Examination of the Relationship between Consensus Democracy and Domestic Terrorism

Bogaards¹

2018

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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Can inclusive institutions tame the threat of domestic terrorism? In a series of recent publications, the political scientists Arend Lijphart and Matt Qvortrup claim that consensus democracies are not only kinder and gentler, but also safer: consensus democracies are less likely to experience deadly domestic terrorism and when they do, they suffer fewer fatalities than majoritarian democracies. This article reexamines the logic and the evidence. It argues that the underlying grievance theory of terrorism contains important gaps and that the statistical results are based on a problematic coding of cases and lack robustness. Lijphart and Qvortrup have opened up an important new line of inquiry, but their results do not withstand scrutiny.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kinder, Gentler, Safer? A Re-Examination of the Relationship between Consensus Democracy and Domestic Terrorism

Bogaards¹

2018

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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“…165-174) terms the "participation/moderation trade-off". With regard to the scholarship on post-rebel parties, the preoccupation with security and democracy has resulted in two sets of literature, the first on the transformation of rebel groups into political parties (Acosta, 2014;Ishiyama & Batta, 2011;Kovacs, 2007;Kovacs & Hatz, 2016;Manning, 2007;Matanock, 2017;Sindre, 2016aSindre, , 2016b, and the second on the impact of such transformation on party system development, democratization and peace (Ishiyama, 2015;Lyons, 2016;Rudloff & Findley, 2016;Suazo, 2013). For the most part, and especially during the early years, academics placed particular emphasis on factors relating to the organizational capacities of post-rebel parties during conflict and in the subsequent period of transition, although the study of the institutional environment has been steadily growing in line with the expansion of research on the impact of party change.…”

Section: From Post-rebel Parties To Islamist Inclusion and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring Post-Rebel Parties in Power: Political Space and Implications for Islamist Inclusion and Moderation

Storm¹

2020

OJPS

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This article analyzes factors relating to moderation and immoderation of post-rebel parties in power, thus making a significant departure from previous studies, which have tended to examine these from a position of political weakness. The rigorous analysis marries approaches and findings from comparative politics and Middle East studies with a view to making an original, qualitative contribution to the academic debate on the inclusion of Islamist parties in formal politics based on lessons learned from the experiences of 12 post-rebel parties across the globe, thus also breaking with the trend for single-country case studies or larger, quantitative studies. The research finds that whether post-rebel parties in power are likely to behave moderately largely depends upon the political environment at the time of the conflict's end, i.e., when these parties first gain entry into the formal political system. Post-rebel parties entering a political system with a tradition of resolving political disagreements within the electoral arena, in which the post-rebel party faces rivalry from sizeable competitors, and where the main issue driving the post-rebel party's support during the conflict is no longer salient, are more likely to behave inclusively and remain moderate once in power. With reference to Islamist parties, the issue thus becomes a question of how to best create an environment that facilitates Islamist moderation upon these parties' inclusion into formal politics, rather than a debate over whether the inclusion or exclusion of such parties will lead to their moderation. This finding is likely to significantly change how scholars approach Islamist parties and their inclusion into formal politics.

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“…Most existing work on EPPs focuses on the quality of resulting parties or elections (for example, De Zeeuw 2007; Söderberg Kovacs 2007). 5 These studies primarily attribute the 5 Some recent cross-national research examines successful transitions by rebel groups to political parties during any type of conflict termination (Acosta 2014;Manning and Smith 2016); other studies suggest examining rebels that participate due to a settlement separately because the causal factors may be different (Matanock 2016). Indeed, the initial studies find these transitions are most common through settlements (or "political victories" as Acosta labels them), compared to military victories.…”

Section: Epps and External Engagementmentioning

confidence: 99%

External Engagement: Explaining the Spread of Electoral Participation Provisions in Civil Conflict Settlements

Matanock

2018

International Studies Quarterly

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When do settlements to civil conflict bring former combatants into normal politics as political parties? Prior work shows that electoral-participation provisions in settlements correlate with enduring peace; such provisions help end some of the longest and deadliest civil conflicts. But they are not always included in negotiated settlements. This article presents original data showing that no settlements included electoral-participation provisions until the end of the Cold War. Since then, they appear in almost half of all settlements. What explains this pattern? I argue that combatants include electoral participation provisions to engage international actors; through these provisions, international actors can often enforce negotiated deals by monitoring and providing incentives conditioned on combatant compliance. This helps to overcome commitment problems that often prevent peaceful settlements of civil conflicts. An analysis of data on civil conflicts and settlements since 1975, as well as illustrative case evidence, provides support for this argument.

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From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations Transition to Political Parties

Cited by 40 publications

References 42 publications

Kinder, Gentler, Safer? A Re-Examination of the Relationship between Consensus Democracy and Domestic Terrorism

Kinder, Gentler, Safer? A Re-Examination of the Relationship between Consensus Democracy and Domestic Terrorism

Exploring Post-Rebel Parties in Power: Political Space and Implications for Islamist Inclusion and Moderation

External Engagement: Explaining the Spread of Electoral Participation Provisions in Civil Conflict Settlements

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