From Force to Legitimation: Rethinking Land Grabs in Cambodia

Abstract

This article moves beyond a focus on the brute force involved in high-profile land grabs to examine the way legitimation, regulation and coercion intersect in Cambodia's property regime. It builds on the 'powers of exclusion' framework developed by Hall, Hirsch and Li to argue that increased connections within civil society in Cambodia and engagement with Western commodity markets have motivated state and private concessionaires to use different means of land exclusion, with less outright force and a greater focus on repressive regulation and legitimation. These exclusionary powers work through informal political connections, secrecy and obfuscation, which the authors term the 'power of informality'. This argument is substantiated with two case studies that illustrate a move away from the dominant narrative of forceful expulsion of land users in Economic Land Concessions (ELC) towards approaches that provide in-kind compensation and carve out land for smallholders: a recent land titling campaign in ELC areas, and the first oil palm ELC to gain responsible investment certification. While the authors remain cautious of the implications of this shift, given the persistence of the power of informality, these cases illustrate the potential for new forms of state-society relations: a shift from fear of authorities to a demand for greater accountability and responsiveness.We would like to thank the editors of Development and Change and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We are also grateful to Duncan McCargo, Steve Heder, Judy Ledgerwood and Tim Kelsall for reading drafts of this article, and to Timothy Gorman and Wendy Wolford for helping to develop our reading of Hall, Hirsch and Li. Alice Beban acknowledges financial support from the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship. Development and Change 48(3): 590-612.

Maladaptation and development as usual? Investigating climate change mitigation and adaptation projects in Cambodia

“…All property claims are exclusionary, but attention to who and what is excluded or included illuminates the inherent contradictions of this process, which we argue is especially important in the current era of climate instability. Using the concept of 'powers of exclusion' to examine land conflicts, Beban et al (2017) argue that in Cambodia the ability to exclude some resource users and include others is also effected through informal networks that link local officials and business elites to the highest echelons of central government. The authors call this the 'power of informality', through which land and other resources are distributed 'off the books' through secretive, exclusionary political networks.…”

“…The authors call this the 'power of informality', through which land and other resources are distributed 'off the books' through secretive, exclusionary political networks. Beban et al (2017) focus primarily on the informality inherent in national-level 'neo-patrimonial' networks that connect the highest levels of government officials as 'patrons' who distribute state resources to 'clients' who can operate even at the village level. While Beban et al suggest that international markets and their standards may make space for more just and equitable exclusions, our data alters this perspective to include collusions, lack of transparency, and off-book activities between national actors and representatives of international donor, conservation, and corporate organizations that complicate the impartiality of the market and the implementation of international standards and safeguards.…”

“…We also note that, while outright use of violent force is less common, exclusion of locals from resources continues as national and international actors deploy the 'power of informality' (Beban, So, & Un, 2017) that downplays conflicts, opens space for elite collusion, and excludes resource users just the same. Our case studies reveal repressive or legitimizing regulations, ignorance of community concerns, and non-compliance with safeguard policies, made possible through informal political connections, secrecy, and obfuscation.…”

“…Communities in this region are already vulnerable through the disruptions and displacements of war, the inequalities born of land policies favouring well-connected community members and external elites (Beban et al, 2017;Work & Beban, 2016), and furthermore from the recent encroachment of sugar cane and cassava plantations into the area (Hunsberger, Work, & Herre, 2018;Pred, 2013). Local people are concerned about the large amount of land consumed by plantations and now also the two irrigation projects, together covering much of the northeastern corner of Kampong Chhnang province.…”

Law and Precariousness in an Authoritarian State: The Case of Illegal House Construction in Vietnam

“…In political regimes under authoritarian or dictatorial rule, as much as law establishes a platform for determining individuals’ rights and entitlements, it also provides a means for the state to curb and precaritize those rights when doing so is deemed economically and politically necessary (Rajah ; Gallagher ; Hurst ). Examples of various social disputes across these regimes have shown how people's access to basic social and economic rights is neither guaranteed nor secured, as the state employs both legal and extralegal tactics to quash these rights in pursuit of its neoliberal development interests (Springer ; Carter and Harding ; Beban, So, and Un ; Gillespie ).…”