From Institutional Interaction to Institutional Integration: The National Supervisory Commission and China's New Anti-corruption Model

Abstract

How does the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission affect China's capacity to curb corruption? Using published materials and fieldwork data, this article addresses this question by comparing the newly established anti-corruption agency with the previous dual-track system. It first examines the previous system by focusing on four dimensions of the interaction between the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) and the People's Procuratorate: complementarity, convergence, competition and conflict. Although the CDI and the procuratorate compensated for each other's deficiencies, competition and conflicts between the two institutions were rife, reducing the efficiency of China's anti-corruption work. The article then investigates what impact the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission has had on China's capacity to combat corruption. This new model strengthens the Party's capacity to curb corruption, and the focus of the anti-corruption work has shifted from punishment to prevention, but the Party still needs to resolve three types of unbalanced power relations: between supervision, prosecution and trial; between central and local authorities; and between the state and citizens.

Recent Anti-corruption Legal Reforms in China

“…That said, the investigation power in corruption cases used to belong to three agencies: CDIs and Bureaus of Supervision as preliminary investigation agencies, and the people's procuratorates as formal investigation agencies. This model was referred to as a "dual-track model" or "three carriages (troika)" [2]. Besides the discipline commissions and the procuratorates, the police departments at all levels were also in charge of the investigation of corruption crimes committed by non-state workers, or commercial bribery in private sectors.…”

The dual role of state shareholders in disclosed corporate misconduct: Evidence from China

“…The CDI teams are responsible for detecting corruption by government officials and scrutinizing the judicial system so that judges and staff of the judicial system will also be inspected for any clue of a crime. Accusations of corruption and interference in court decisions will also be carefully investigated (Li & Wang, 2019). Covering up misconduct cases or not involving the issues in prosecution will run the risk of being inspected instead.…”

The National Supervision Commission: A “Subaltern History”

“…control over the local governments vertically, and the different departments horizontally” (Deng, 2018: 70). Other studies have instead discussed the NSC in the context of the dialectics between the party discipline apparatus and the judicial system, and between center and periphery (Li and Wang, 2019). Another feature of the NSC to attract further analyses has been the controversial power of liuzhi 留置—a detention power directly inherited by the CCDI from the administrative supervision organs.…”