How does the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission affect China's capacity to curb corruption? Using published materials and fieldwork data, this article addresses this question by comparing the newly established anti-corruption agency with the previous dual-track system. It first examines the previous system by focusing on four dimensions of the interaction between the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) and the People's Procuratorate: complementarity, convergence, competition and conflict. Although the CDI and the procuratorate compensated for each other's deficiencies, competition and conflicts between the two institutions were rife, reducing the efficiency of China's anti-corruption work. The article then investigates what impact the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission has had on China's capacity to combat corruption. This new model strengthens the Party's capacity to curb corruption, and the focus of the anti-corruption work has shifted from punishment to prevention, but the Party still needs to resolve three types of unbalanced power relations: between supervision, prosecution and trial; between central and local authorities; and between the state and citizens.

This article empirically investigates the effects of administrative monitoring on the misuse of funds by local governments and provides a representative model of fiscal decentralization with political centralization, where administrative monitoring relies on the top‐down hierarchy of the bureaucratic system in China based on a unique data set from audit programs. We show a double effect between distance and monitoring in local China. The incentive for misusing public funds can be strengthened if the county (a) is governed by a leader whose tenure is longer than 3 years, (b) is governed by a politician from outside the county, or (c) receives more transfer payments. These findings suggest that the administrative monitoring of local governments can be vital to remedying the misuse of public funds.

Background: It is currently the most cost-effective management model to have multiple professionals from relevant institutions collaborate so as to provide integrated chronic disease management services. The "classified, color-coded, hierarchical and regionalized" chronic disease management model in Youxi County, Fujian Province is a typical case in China. However, related research is limited. This paper aims to analyze the practice measures and lessons learned in Youxi County, focusing on the professional integration of service providers. Methods:From January to March 2021, interviews with 15 key informants in Youxi County were conducted to collect qualitative data, which was analyzed by the thematic framework method as well as the policy data, using the professional integration dimension in the evaluation framework of the integrated healthcare system.Results: A series of measures were taken, such as improving the professional division and collaboration mechanism, establishing the incentive and restraint mechanism geared toward chronic disease management, formulating norms and standards of chronic disease management for patients with different color labels, and promoting the compatibility of inter-professional value and culture under the governmental institutional supply and the organizational support of the tight county healthcare alliance in Youxi County, to prompt professionals of different levels and types to collaborate in order to provide integrated chronic disease management services. However, some problems remained, such as limited capacity of primary health care, the relatively narrow range and weak effect of the incentive and restraint mechanism, inadequate implementation of the norms and standards, and so forth. Conclusions:Our findings provide reference for other regions in China and other lowand middle-income countries in exploring the integrated chronic disease management model. Long-term follow-up surveys and mixed research designs are required in the future to enrich relevant evidence.

To date, few studies have focused on how the public has perceived the effectiveness of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Furthermore, little is known about how the public has assessed the functions of the ICAC during the political-economic convergence between Hong Kong and mainland China since 1997. This study attempts to explore local politicians' perceptions towards the ICAC in post-1997 Hong Kong. The quantitative data show that the important historical juncture of mainlandization has been politicized in Hong Kong and has deeply influenced the seriousness attached by local politicians to corruption. Moreover, a mediating path of the effect of "Conflict of Interest" on the "Perceived Seriousness of Corruption" has been found, that is, mainlandization is found to have brought about increased levels of conflict of interest among government officials, which has weakened the symbolic anti-corruption function of the ICAC and, in turn, has affected the perceived seriousness attached to corruption.

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