From Life Space to Polling Place: The Relevance of Personal Concerns for Voting Behavior

Brody, Richard A.; Sniderman, Paul M.

doi:10.1017/s0007123400001022

Cited by 208 publications

(98 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…However, our interpretation of this phenomenon differs somewhat from theirs. The factor loadings of the personal economic concerns coincides with the argument that people generally do not connect their own situation with politics because they are self-rather than system-blaming (Brody & Sniderman, 1977;Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979). The difference in interpretation comes with regard to the items presumed to measure collective orientation.…”

Section: Assessing the Validity Of Available Measuressupporting

confidence: 64%

Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1980

1985

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This article explores two dimensions of public evaluations of presidential candidates on the basis open-ended survey questions from 1952 to 1980. The first dimension looks at whether citizens evaluate candidates on the basis of policies, performance, or strictly candidate attributes; the second examines the time perspective of these assessments, that is, whether they are retrospective or prospective. It is found that incumbents have been judged primarily on the basis of retrospective performance, challengers on prospective policy, and candidates running in nonincumbent races on prospective performance. Throughout the period from 1952 to 1980 both policy and performance considerations have become increasingly related to the vote. Except for 1964, performance has outweighed policy as a predictor of the vote, with an emphasis on retrospective evaluations whenever a incumbent runs for reelection and on prospective assessments in nonincumbent races. The 1964 case provides the best example of a policy mandate, with the 1972 election also fitting the pattern to a lesser degree. The data for the 1980 election, however, fail to support the claim of a mandate for Reagan's policy stands.

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Section: Assessing the Validity Of Available Measuressupporting

confidence: 64%

Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1980

1985

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“…al 1960;Franklin, Lyons, and March 2004;Plutzer 2002). More recently, several papers document the positive correlation between past and current decisions in the most central political behavior: voter turnout (Brody and Sniderman 1977;Goldstein and Ridout 2002;Verba and Nie 1972). As a result, Plutzer (2002, p. 42) argues that "virtually all major works on turnout have concluded that voting behavior is, in part, a gradually acquired…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Persistence in Political Participation

Meredith

2009

QJPS

186

116

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“…For example, if income has an impact on turnout and individual incomes usually do not change, then what seems like habitual turnout might be persistence in income levels over time. To that end, several studies have controlled for both known and unknown factors that might influence turnout using standard analysis of National Election Studies panel data (Brody and Sniderman 1977), instrumental variables analysis of the same data (Green and Shachar 2000), and evidence from a randomized field experiment (Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003). These studies all find that past voting behavior is positively and strongly correlated with future voting behavior-people who voted 3 For example, in 1,000 simulations using BDT's base model assumptions, 98% of the individual propensities end up closer to .5 than to 0 or 1. in the previous election turn out at a rate of about 50 percentage points higher than those who do not.…”

Section: E P P a P A P I T I T I T I T I T I T I T I Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

Habitual Voting and Behavioral Turnout

Fowler

2006

The Journal of Politics

132

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Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting (2003) ates significant turnout in large electorates, even when the cost of voting is relatively high. However, this article shows that significant turnout is due in part to moderating feedback in the BDT model. As an individual's probability of voting decreases from .5, moderating feedback decreases the strength of downward adjustment and increases the strength of upward adjustment in the probability of voting. This method of updating the individual probability of voting after each election inherently biases the model towards its main result of high turnout in large populations.This article also shows that moderating feedback causes unrealistic turnout behavior. Most individuals in the BDT model are casual voters. In other words, sometimes people make it to the polls and sometimes they do not, but hardly anyone in the model makes it a habit always to vote or always to stay home. This result is at odds with a substantial literature that indicates most people are habitual voters-they either always vote or always abstain (Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003;Green and Shachar 2000;Miller and Shanks 1996;Plutzer 2002;Verba and Nie 1972).I offer an alternative model that posits a different method of reinforcement and inhibition for adjusting turnout probabilities. I show that the alternative model usually does not yield moderating feedback and then compare its behavior to the behavior of the BDT model. Both models generate significant turnout in large populations, but the model without feedback yields much more plausible levels of habitual voting among individuals. Thus, the model without feedback appears to correspond better to empirical data at both the individual and aggregate levels. (Myerson 1998;Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985). This is because a single vote becomes less and less likely to have an impact on the election as the size of the population increases. If the cost of voting is significant (e.g., the cost of learning about the candidates, going to the polls, and so on), then it is likely to dominate any benefits derived from the infinitesimal probability of affecting the outcome. Unless we assume collateral benefits like the rewarding feeling of doing one's civic duty, rational choice models yield predictions that are at odds with the reality that millions of people vote in large elections.The paradox of voting has recently caused formal theorists to move away from a rational model of choice towards a behavioral model of choice. In particular, Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting (2003; hereafter BDT) explore the possibility that reinforcement learning can explain voter turnout. Their behavioral model of turnout discards any notion that individuals are prospective optimizers. Instead, individuals are adaptive satisficers. Each person's well-being is affected by the choice to vote or abstain and the outcome of the election. If a person achieves a satisfactory level of well-being then the turnout choice is reinforced and becomes more likely in the next election. If not, the choice is inhibite...

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From Life Space to Polling Place: The Relevance of Personal Concerns for Voting Behavior

Cited by 208 publications

References 3 publications

Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1980

Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1980

Persistence in Political Participation

Habitual Voting and Behavioral Turnout

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