From Negative to Positive Integration: European State Aid Control Through Soft and Hard Law

Abstract

Michael Blauberger is a researcher at the Collaborative Research Center 597 "Transformations of the State" at the University of Bremen. He was formerly a doctoral fellow at the MPIfG. blauberger@uni-bremen.deMPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowledge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF). AbstractEuropean state aid control, a part of competition policy, typically follows the logic of negative integration. It significantly constrains the potential for Member States to distort competition by reducing their ability to subsidize industry. In addition, this paper argues, ambiguous Treaty rules and heterogeneous Member States' preferences have enabled the European Commission to act as a supranational entrepreneur, not only enforcing the prohibition of distortive state aid, but also developing its own vision of "good" state aid policy. In order to prevent or to settle political conflict about individual decisions, the Commission has sought to establish more general criteria for the state aid which it still deems admissible. These criteria have been codified into a complex system of soft law and, more recently, hard state aid law. The Commission has thus created positive integration "from above" and increasingly influences the objectives of national state aid policies.

State Aid and Export Competitiveness in the EU

“…The Commission is more sceptical about sector-specific aid which is more and more limited to rescue and restructuring aid measures. The European Commission's preference for horizontal state aid is founded in the belief that horizontal aid is less distortive to competition than sectoral aid (Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden, 2006) and that it contributes to the Commission's own market-correcting or redistributive policy goals and is therefore linked to an objective of 'common interest' (Blauberger, 2008). This preference for horizontal aid on the side of the Commission has a big impact on the type of state aid provided by Member States -or at least the way it is notified.…”

Les partenariats public-privé dans les infrastructures de télécommunications à haut et très haut débit : les enjeux concurrentiels

“…Si le Japon, la Corée du Sud et même les États-Unis ont pu soutenir le développement d'infrastructures à haut débit au travers de soutiens publics directs (conditions de financement privilégiées en faveur des opérateurs historiques pour les premiers et impulsion budgétaire de 7,2 milliards de dollars dans le dernier cas), de telles aides directes ne vont pas a priori d'elles-mêmes dans le cadre européen (Papadias et al, 2009). La prohibition des aides publiques constitue un principe de base de la politique de concurrence européenne et constitue en ce sens un « levier d'intégration négative » (Blauberger, 2008), reposant sur la garantie d'une concurrence libre et non faussée non seulement vis-à-vis des acteurs du marché mais aussi entre les territoires, notamment pour prévenir les dynamiques collectivement sous-optimales de concurrence fiscale (Malavolti-Grimal et Marty, 2010).…”

New Modes of Governance in Europe

“…These criteria have been codified into a complex system of soft law. Although soft rules are formally non-binding for member states, the European Commission hardly allows any aid which deviates from its own criteria (Blauberger 2008b).…”

“…Since Eastern enlargement has significantly increased the workload of the Commission, a further shift from soft to hard law seems highly probable (cf. Blauberger 2008aBlauberger , 2008b). …”