From Panda to Dragon: An Analysis of China’s Maritime Actions and Reactions in the East China Sea and Their Implications since 2012

Abstract

In the 21st century, China’s rise has been shifting global and regional geopolitical scenarios. Faced with its growth and fears of being perceived as a threat, China sought to associate its economic and political emergence with the preservation of the current international system, emphasizing speeches about a peaceful development and harmonious world in which it would be an actor who wants to grow and accommodate the world order. However, changes in the balance of power and its continued rise have caused China’s behaviour to change in its own region, especially regarding maritime disputes and affecting other countries’ perceptions. By applying Neoclassical Realism, this paper analyses the Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century, elucidating its behaviour in terms of the country’s action and reactions regarding the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and shows the perceptions of other countries to that behaviour. The article concludes that perceptions concerning the balance of power, Chinese capabilities, nationalism, regime legitimacy, and on leadership images affect the intensity of Beijing’s responses and foreign policy about maritime territorial disputes. Also, the article shows that China’s growing assertiveness in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea is pushing countries that have territorial disputes with China to grow closer.

Mobilizing resources and signaling intentions: a neoclassical realist analysis of Japan’s domestic and international instrumentalization of the Senkaku Islands dispute and China’s maritime assertiveness

“…Those can be important means, capable of assisting the government to stay in power and change security and foreign policies (Morgenthau 1948;Carr 2001;Kitchen 2010;Schweller 2018;Oliveira 2019;2021). That's why propaganda about threats can strengthen the national cohesion or the very character of the Nation (Sterling-Folker 2009; Morgenthau 1948), or even stimulate in-group and out-group perceptions.…”

“…Japan argues that those islands were incorporated into its territory through Okinawa Prefecture in 1895, after the authorities concluded that there had been no previous occupation of these territories by another country. In the Post-World War II period, Japan considers that the islands came under US control due to the San Francisco Treaty (1951) and returned to Japan in 1972 with the Reversion of Okinawa (Oliveira 2019;2021).…”

“…The Chinese government argues that by the end of the 19th century, with the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), some Chinese territories were ceded to Japan due to the Shimonoseki Treaty (1895) -including the Senkaku / Diaoyu islands. Thus, these should have been returned with the unconditional Japanese acceptance of the Cairo Declaration (1943), Potsdam Declaration (1945 and the San Francisco Treaty (1951), given that Japan was obliged to return Taiwan and the territories usurped during its imperialist past to Chinese sovereignty (Oliveira 2021).…”

“…Since then, the islands started to be disputed by China, Japan and Taiwan. The major escalations episodes occurred in 1978,1990,1996, and in the beginning of the 21 st century, between 2004-2005, in 2010 and in 2012, the last two had greater impacts for the Sino-Japanese relations (Drifte 2013;Oliveira 2019;2021).…”

“…However, as history has shown, the Japanese security policies are constrained both domestically and internationally since the World War II (Pyle 2007;Hughes 2016;Saltzman 2015;Pugliese and Insisa 2017). Thus, one of the ways that the Japanese Prime Minister found to boost his capabilities and gain support for change in security and foreign policy was to endorse the image of a threatening regional environment, especially because of China and North Korea (Pugliese 2015;Pugliese and Insisa 2017;Oliveira 2019;2021).…”