From Self‐Respect to Respect for Others

Abstract

The leading accounts of respect for others usually assume that persons have a rational nature, which is a marvelous thing, so they should be respected like other objects of ‘awesome’ value. Kant's views about the ‘value’ of humanity, which have inspired contemporary discussions of respect, have been interpreted in this way. I propose an alternative interpretation in which Kant proceeds from our own rational self‐regard, through our willingness to reciprocate with others, to duties of respect for others. This strategy, which shares some similarities with moral contractualism, offers a way to justify other‐regarding moral requirements from self‐regarding rational dispositions.

A Contractualist Reading of Kant's Proof of the Formula of Humanity

“…In the Groundwork , where Kant tries to seek out and justify the supreme principle of morality, he presents FH as a thin principle that derives from FUL and a very general rational requirement to treat one's rational nature as an end in itself, without filling in the details about how, in particular, to treat oneself in that way. As I argue elsewhere, we find Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals using the same strategy by clarifying what is involved in treating one's own rational nature as an end in itself and then employing FUL to derive duties of beneficence and respect for others (see Cureton 2013). For example, Kant claims that we are rationally required to pursue our own happiness (although he emphasizes that we have no duty to do so) and we are rationally required to maintain our self-respect and avoid servility.…”

Comparison of Public, Private Schools and Deeni Madaris Students Regarding Respect as Moral Adjustment in Society

“…respect. (Cureton, 2013) described that respectful students are authentic listeners. They listen to their parents, teachers and elders.…”

Membership in a kind: Nature, norms, and profound disability

“…Respect, writes Dillon (2018), is the “acknowledgment in attitude and conduct of the dignity of persons as ends in themselves,” and it is “not only appropriate but also morally and unconditionally required: the status and worth of persons is such that they must always be respected,” so that we treat others and ourselves always as an end, never merely as a means. Kantian respect is sometimes referred to as moral recognition respect, as distinct from appraisal respect (Darwall 1977), and other types of respect that have special relevance to people with disabilities, including care respect, and respect that demands that we refrain from patronising or stigmatising someone (Dillon 1992; Cranor 1983; Cureton 2013). There is, then, much more to be said about respecting profoundly disabled people than I say here, not only because some of these people have a capacity for rationality on many non‐Kantian conceptions, but also because there are non‐Kantian ways in which profoundly disabled people might be disrespected.…”