No abstract

The leading accounts of respect for others usually assume that persons have a rational nature, which is a marvelous thing, so they should be respected like other objects of ‘awesome’ value. Kant's views about the ‘value’ of humanity, which have inspired contemporary discussions of respect, have been interpreted in this way. I propose an alternative interpretation in which Kant proceeds from our own rational self‐regard, through our willingness to reciprocate with others, to duties of respect for others. This strategy, which shares some similarities with moral contractualism, offers a way to justify other‐regarding moral requirements from self‐regarding rational dispositions.

I aim to identify and describe some basic elements of a Rawlsian approach that may help us to think conscientiously about how, from the standpoint of justice, we should treat the disabled. Rawls has been criticized for largely ignoring issues of this sort. These criticisms lose their appeal, I suggest, when we distinguish between a Rawlsian standpoint and the limited project Rawls mainly undertakes in A Theory of Justice. There his explicit aim is to find principles of justice, which are to govern the basic structures of a closed, well-ordered society that exists under reasonably favorable conditions, that would be chosen by parties in the original position from among a small set of traditional conceptions of justice. Once we develop a conception of justice for a society like that, Rawlsians hope we can make certain revisions to find principles of justice for a society like ours. Finally, I sketch what seems to me a plausible way for a Rawlsian to begin thinking about how a society like ours should provide justice for its disabled citizens.

This introductory chapter, by volume editors Adam Cureton and David Wasserman, provides an overview of the Handbook. Its first section covers the history of philosophical thinking about disability, from the 19th century to the disability rights movements of the 20th century and present-day. Following this is an outline of the purpose of the book, discussing how disability raises some of the deepest conceptual and normative issues about human embodiment and well-being; dignity, respect, justice and equality; and personal and social identity. Chapters will cover these as well as pressing practical questions for educational, health, reproductive, and technology policy, and confront controversial questions about the scope and direction of the human and civil rights movements. The introduction concludes with chapter summaries.

I draw on my experiences of passing as non-disabled to explain how a disabled person can hide his disability, why he might do so, and what costs and risks he and others might face along the way. Passing as non-disabled can bring greater social acceptance and inclusion in joint projects, an enhanced sense of belonging, pride, and self-worth, and an easier time forming and maintaining personal relationships. Yet hiding one’s disability can also undermine some of these same values; for example, it prevents someone from living up to normal social expectations or sharing important aspects of himself with others. Hiding a disability can also interfere with a person’s self-respect, self-acceptance, integrity, and self-development. Although the chapter does not take a stand on whether hiding a disability is, overall, prudent, wise, or morally justified, it draws out some lessons about disability from why someone might want to hide it.