How can the advances of social and developmental psychology be integrated? This conceptual paper proposes to examine four basic theoretical models of social situations through which learning and development have been observed in the post-piagetian tradition: the psychosocial triangle, the frame, models of transfer and transitions, and models integrating the notion of cultural instrument. We show different dynamics highlighted by series of studies using these models. We finally discuss the notions of development and of the person emerging through such social developmental approaches.
The wide field of social developmental psychologyHow can social psychologists account for changes that people undergo through their interaction with others and their world? And how can developmental psychologists, interested in the genesis of new forms of understanding, take account of the social world in which people live?Over the past decades, important contributions have integrated social and developmental perspectives in psychology (among which Baltes & Staudinger, 1996; Carpendale & Müller, 2004;Durkin, 1995;Duveen, 1997;Mercer, 1995;Perret-Clermont, Carugati, & Oates, 2004;Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991;Rogoff, 1998;Wegerif, Mercer, & Dawes, 1999) and retraced the historical and theoretical evolution of this integration (see Valsiner, 1998;Valsiner & Van der Veer, 2000). In this paper, as a contribution, we propose to identify four basic theoretical models of social situations through which development has been observed in post-piagetian studies. Our analysis is conceptual rather than historical. The four models we identify have been structuring series of studies, addressing specific questions. Today these models coexist; as they offer contrasting "lenses" on the socially shared reality, they are chosen by researchers to guide different empirical studies. Like lenses, these models enable to see different phenomena: a virus cannot be examined with the same lens than a conflict in the workplace, nor can individual memory be studied in the same way than collective remembering. None of these lenses is better than the other; only each enables a specific