From Standpoint Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression

Abstract

Standpoint epistemology is committed to a cluster of views that pays special attention to the role of social identity in knowledge-acquisition. Of particular interest here is the situated knowledge thesis. This thesis holds that for certain propositions p, whether an epistemic agent is in a position to know that p depends on some nonepistemic facts related to the epistemic agent's social identity. In this article, I examine two possible ways to interpret this thesis. My first goal here is to clarify existing interpretations of this thesis that appear in the literature but that are undeveloped and often mistakenly conflated. In so doing, I aim to make clear the different versions of standpoint epistemology that one might accept and defend. This project is of significance, I argue, because standpoint epistemology provides helpful tools for understanding a phenomenon of recent interest: epistemic oppression. My second goal is to provide an analysis that makes clear how each of the readings I put forth can be used to illuminate forms of epistemic oppression.The landscape of epistemology is changing. Epistemologists are no longer concerned solely with questions regarding what conditions are necessary for knowledge or how knowledge is transmitted; they have instead shifted their attention to concerns regarding our epistemic practices and how those practices might oppress. Epistemic oppression, the unwarranted exclusion or obstruction of certain epistemic agents from the practices of knowledge-production (Dotson 2012, 2014), has been the focus of much work produced by feminist epistemologists in the last decade, and rightly so. If the aim of epistemology is to bring us closer to truth, then any practice that threatens to subvert this aim ought to be thoroughly investigated. 1 In this article, I argue that in order to understand, address, and eliminate epistemic oppression, we must appeal to the conceptual tools made available by standpoint epistemology.Broadly speaking, standpoint epistemology is committed to the thesis that some nonepistemic features related to an agent's social identity make a difference to what an epistemic agent is in a position to know (Hartsock 1983;Haraway 1988;Harding

Operationalizing Critical Race Theory in the Marketplace

“…An outgrowth of Black feminist thought, standpoint epistemologies situate knowledge as the product of hierarchically valued social experiences and posit that the knowledge (social experiences) of dominant social groups is normalized as universal “truth,” whereas the knowledge (social experiences) of subaltern social groups are marginalized, if not completely made invisible (Anderson 2020). As a consequence, the subaltern’s alternative ways of knowing, which typically possess an epistemic advantage over that of the dominant social group in topic areas associated with their subjugated status, are rendered null and void (Toole 2019). For example, community voice, or the input of those most proximal to the focal topic, may be ignored in favor of scholarly voice.…”

Linguagem e Ontologia: questões sobre conhecimento e agência=Language and Ontology: questions on knowledge and agency

“…Tal reconhecimento é, porém, incompatível com as suas análises sobre o modo como lacunas nos nossos recursos hermenêuticos coletivos podem causar 'uma desvantagem cognitiva aguda' em membros de grupos marginalizados (Fricker 2007:151). recursos interpretativos são negligenciados -ou, de outro modo, excluídos -pelos recursos dominantes, não entra no âmbito da conceção de injustiça hermenêutica apresentada por Fricker uma vez que, nestes casos, os sujeitos com uma maior desvantagem cognitiva não são os sujeitos marginalizados (Mason 2011;Pohlhaus 2012;Dotson 2012;Toole 2019). Pelo contrário, a marginalização resulta e é aqui, simultaneamente, resultado de um tipo de ignorância situada que afeta primeiramente os membros de grupos dominantes que negligenciam, ou rejeitam ativamente, os recursos dos marginalizados.…”

At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing

“…Fortunately, there are ways for travellers to anticipate such situations, and employ strategies to avoid these blunders: they can do research in advance, or employ a guide. 2 According to standpoint epistemologists, an agent's social position can provide unique access to information, concepts, or ways of interpreting information (see Toole, 2019). See Calhoun (1989) for example of how this could put one out-of-touch with what is morally important).…”