Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy 2017
DOI: 10.1145/3140241.3140250
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From System Specification to Anomaly Detection (and back)

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Cited by 26 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…Signature-based Intrusion Detection Signature-based intrusion detection compares pre-defined behavior (known as golden behavior or signature) to identify the the abnormal event during runtime [23]. Though these techniques effectively identify the intrusion with a small number of false positives they require a precisely calibrated signature [93]. Therefore, such techniques are not feasible if designers and IP providers are not trusted.…”
Section: Specificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Signature-based Intrusion Detection Signature-based intrusion detection compares pre-defined behavior (known as golden behavior or signature) to identify the the abnormal event during runtime [23]. Though these techniques effectively identify the intrusion with a small number of false positives they require a precisely calibrated signature [93]. Therefore, such techniques are not feasible if designers and IP providers are not trusted.…”
Section: Specificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By checking the invariance specification c < 10, the counterexample will be the desired trace. The assumption used in previous tests may look too artificial, so we present a real-world example taken from [16] and shown in Fig. 5.…”
Section: Experimental Evaluationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fauri et al [4] presented feature selection based anomaly detection system, where each feature is similar to an event. However, features are extracted from the ICS device logs based on the expert knowledge, which may be prone to error as discussed earlier.…”
Section: A Anomaly Detectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, detecting process-based attacks is challenging. A stealthy attacker may try to disrupt the industrial process by changing the state of a system such that it does not to raise a safety alarm but does disrupt the process [4]. Fig 1 shows an example of process related attack where attacker "turned off the water pump before tank was full" and then tried to damage the water tank system by rapid "on and off" control of the water pump.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%