From the lab to the field: An experimental investigation of the provision of a club good

Bchir, Mohamed Ali

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2014.03.004

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Result 1: Farmers contribute more than students do in the lab. This result is coherent with findings from other contexts of experimental collective action games, such as the findings reported by Stoop et al (2012), Saldarriaga-Isaza et al (2019, Bchir (2014), and Cadsby and Maynes (1998) who also observed higher provision rates and more sustained cooperation in the field with artefactual participants as compared to the lab with student participants. One explanation could be that farmers in the same geographical area identify more with the economic situation of the members of their group and the environmental impact of their choices.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 91%

“…This difference could be explained by two factors. First, the average group contribution is generally higher among farmers, who might just be better cooperators (Bchir, 2014). Second, different motivations may be introduced in the two different samples due to the respective context (Levitt & List, 2007b).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the specific case of TPGG experiments, studies on lab-to-field comparisons find that on average, an artefactual sample contributes more at group level across all treatment variations and is more successful in sustaining cooperation at or above the threshold than a student sample (punishment and external advisor with frame and miners in Saldarriaga-Isaza et al (2019), membership fee without frame and farmers in Bchir (2014), baseline without frame and nurses in Cadsby and Maynes (1998)). Sladarriaga-Isaza et al (2019) show that lab experiments on social dilemmas can be externally valid.…”

Section: From Lab To Field: Generalizability Of Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can collective conditionality improve agri-environmental contracts? From lab to field experiments

Limbach,

Rozan,

Le Coent

et al. 2023

Rev Agric Food Environ Stud

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Individual subsidy payments that are conditional on a collective contribution threshold could provide a viable resolution to the insufficient and dispersed adoption of agri-environmental contracts aiming at attaining environmental quality targets. Indeed, in a decontextualized laboratory experiment based on a threshold public good game (TPGG), Le Coent et al. (2014) offer promising results regarding a conditional subsidy compared to an unconditional subsidy (i.e. the standard subsidy in existing agrienvironmental schemes). In this article, we propose to improve the external validity of these results by transposing this laboratory experiment to the "field" with farmers. To do so, we carry out a contextualized lab-in-field experiment with farmers by explicitly mentioning agri-environmental contracts and water quality. Our results show that farmers cooperate even more successfully than students and sustain more efficient outcomes over time. Considering a between-subject, both in the lab with students, and in the "lab-in-field" experiment with farmers, our results indicate that average group contributions are not significantly different under the conditional subsidy mechanism and under the unconditional subsidy mechanism. Indeed the conditional subsidy introduces two behavioural responses (perceived risks and initial beliefs on others' contributions) having opposite effects on contributions, and compensating each other. The conditional incentive mechanism thus shows promising potential as a tool for agri-environmental policy since it avoids the pay-for-nothing trap of the unconditional subsidy mechanism without discouraging contributions.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: From Lab To Field: Generalizability Of Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can collective conditionality improve agri-environmental contracts? From lab to field experiments

Limbach,

Rozan,

Le Coent

et al. 2023

Rev Agric Food Environ Stud

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“…Ce n'est cependant que depuis peu, suite aux enseignements d'Elinor Ostrom dans son ouvrage de référence (Ostrom, 1990), qu'une école de chercheurs s'est concentrée sur l'expérimentation en laboratoire (Anderies et al, 2013 ;Janssen et al, 2011) ou sur le terrain (Bchir, 2014 ;Otto et Wechsung, 2014 ;Cardenas et Ostrom, 2004 ;Anderies et al, 2011 ;Castillo et al, 2011) pour appliquer à la gestion de l'eau les principes de l'économie comportementale et de l'expéri-mentation économique. En particulier, Bchir (2014) analyse le problème en mobilisant le modèle des biens publics avec seuil. Farolfi et al (2014) La question traitée dans la présente étude concerne l'influence des deux types d'information définis plus haut (« institutionnelle » et « sociale ») sur le comportement de sujets économiques en termes de contribution à un bien public tel qu'un système d'irrigation permettant de bénéficier de l'eau agricole.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Fourniture d’information et consentement à payer l’eau d’irrigation dans les groupements de développement agricole tunisiens. Une étude par l’économie expérimentale

Farolfi¹,

Dubois²,

Morardet³

et al. 2018

Cah. Agric.

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Résumé -L'eau d'irrigation est une ressource cruciale pour le développement économique et social en Tunisie. Dans un contexte de décentralisation et de délégation du rôle de l'État, une part importante de la gestion de cette eau d'irrigation a été confiée aux groupements de développement agricole (GDA). Ces groupements souffrent cependant d'un manque de reconnaissance de la part des usagers, qui se manifeste essentiellement par un faible consentement de leur part à payer les redevances. Dans cet article nous nous demandons dans quelle mesure l'information fournie aux usagers sur le fonctionnement du système (information « institutionnelle ») et/ou sur les décisions prises par les autres usagers (information « sociale ») peut influencer leur consentement à payer. Notre analyse s'est faite en deux temps. Nous avons commencé par une enquête sur le terrain, laquelle révèle effectivement une demande des irrigants en matière de diffusion d'informations. Nous avons ensuite élaboré une expérience permettant d'isoler l'impact de différents types d'information sur les décisions prises par les individus dans le cadre d'un jeu qui a des propriétés proches de la situation de terrain. Les données collectées en laboratoire confirment l'existence d'une relation de causalité entre l'information fournie aux usagers et leur consentement à payer pour une ressource commune comme l'eau d'irrigation. Mots clés : information / économie expérimentale / eau / irrigation / TunisieAbstract -Information provision and willingness to pay irrigation water in Tunisian local associations for agricultural development. An experimental economics study. Irrigation water is a crucial resource for economic and social development in Tunisia. In a context of decentralization and State devolution, the local associations for agricultural development or 'Groupements de Développement Agricole (GDA)' manage today a large share of irrigation water in the country. However, these institutions are experiencing a lack of acknowledgment by water users, resulting in a low willingness to pay (WTP) for water. In this article, we study to what extent information provided to users on the functioning of the system (« institutional » information) and/or on the decisions taken by other users (« social » information) can affect their WTP. Our analysis is twofold. A field survey first revealed the farmers' demand for better information provision. A laboratory experiment allowed then to isolate the impact of the two types of information on subjects' decisions through a game with similar properties to those observed in the field. Data collected in the lab confirm the existence of a causality relation between information provided to users and their WTP for a common resource such as irrigation water.

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Chipping in for a cleaner technology: Experimental evidence from a framed threshold public good game with students and artisanal miners

Isaza

Villegas-Palacio

Arango

2019

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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From the lab to the field: An experimental investigation of the provision of a club good

Cited by 3 publications

References 19 publications

Can collective conditionality improve agri-environmental contracts? From lab to field experiments

Can collective conditionality improve agri-environmental contracts? From lab to field experiments

Fourniture d’information et consentement à payer l’eau d’irrigation dans les groupements de développement agricole tunisiens. Une étude par l’économie expérimentale

Chipping in for a cleaner technology: Experimental evidence from a framed threshold public good game with students and artisanal miners

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