From Transfers to Tax 'Co-Occupation': The Italian Reform of Intergovernmental Finance

Abstract

SERIES e MATEF sono pubblicati a cura del Dipartimento di Scienze economiche dell'Università degli Studi di Bari. I lavori riflettono esclusivamente le opinioni degli autori e non impegnano la responsabilità del Dipartimento. SERIES e MATEF vogliono promuovere la circolazione di studi ancora preliminari e incompleti, per suscitare commenti critici e suggerimenti. Si richiede di tener conto della natura provvisoria dei lavori per eventuali citazioni o per ogni altro uso. SERIES and MATEF are published under the auspices of the Department of Economics of the University of Bari. Any opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those of the Department. Often SERIES and MATEF divulge preliminary or incomplete work, circulated to favor discussion and comment. Citation and use of these paper should consider their provisional character.

Kırgızistan’da Vergilendirme Yetkileri Açısından Yerel Yönetimlerin Mali Özerkliğinin Değerlendirilmesi

“…Bazı durumlarda hem merkezi hem de yerel yönetimler vergilerin yerelleştirilmesinden kaçınmaktadırlar. Longobardi (2013) İtalya'daki yönetimler arası mali ilişkilerin reformlarını araştırdığı çalışmasında merkezi yönetimimin seçmenlerin farklı mali sorumlulukları tam olarak ayırt edemeyebileceğinden; yerel yönetimler ise seçmenlere vergi ödetmemeyi tercih ettiklerinden vergilendirme yetkisinin yerelleştirilmesine karşı olduklarını öne sürmektedir.…”

Measuring horizontal fiscal imbalance: the case of Italian municipalities

“…More recently, the law on fiscal federalism (Law No. 42 of 5th May, 2009) has provided the country with an important opportunity to modernise intergovernmental financial relations and to improve the efficiency of SCGs (Longobardi, 2013).…”

Below the salt: decentralizing value-added taxes

“…Despite several subsequent moves by the central government to go further in the direction of abolishing the tax, however, as yet the IRAP continues to exist, perhaps largely because no similarly productive source of regional finance has been suggested as a substitute. Although a 2008 law allowed regions to set the rate and even to some extent to alter the base, it was never implemented (Longobardi 2013). Similarly, a 2011 law both gave regions more discretion in setting IRAP rates and provided that IRAP revenues should be distributed on a destination basis beginning in 2013, on the basis of the information on the location of final consumers that is required on existing IRAP returns.…”

“…Despite this legal victory, the then Italian government again said it intended to abolish the tax and began this time by reducing the basic IRAP rate from 4.25to 3.9 percent. Although taxpayers dislike the tax because it has to be paid even by non-profitable businesses and most political parties seem to want to abolish or at least reform it (Longobardi 2013), the IRAP continues to survive.…”