Fully Deniable Interactive Encryption

Canetti, Ran; Park, Sunoo; Poburinnaya, Oxana

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_27

Cited by 19 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…However, the deployment of a PD system already raises suspicion about the existence of sensitive data. A similar issue also exists for deniable encryption [7,6].…”

Section: Invisible Pdmentioning

confidence: 87%

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SoK: Plausibly Deniable Storage

Chen¹,

Liang²,

Cărbunar³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Data privacy is critical in instilling trust and empowering the societal pacts of modern technology-driven democracies. Unfortunately, it is under continuous attack by overreaching or outright oppressive governments, including some of the world's oldest democracies. Increasingly-intrusive anti-encryption laws severely limit the ability of standard encryption to protect privacy. New defense mechanisms are needed.Plausible deniability (PD) is a powerful property, enabling users to hide the existence of sensitive information in a system under direct inspection by adversaries. Popular encrypted storage systems such as TrueCrypt and other research efforts have attempted to also provide plausible deniability. Unfortunately, these efforts have often operated under less well-defined assumptions and adversarial models. Careful analyses often uncover not only high overheads but also outright security compromise. Further, our understanding of adversaries, the underlying storage technologies, as well as the available plausible deniable solutions have evolved dramatically in the past two decades. The main goal of this work is to systematize this knowledge. It aims to:1. identify key PD properties, requirements, and approaches; 2. present a direly-needed unified framework for evaluating security and performance; 3. explore the challenges arising from the critical interplay between PD and modern system layered stacks;4. propose a new "trace-oriented" PD paradigm, able to decouple security guarantees from the underlying systems and thus ensure a higher level of flexibility and security independent of the technology stack.This work is meant also as a trusted guide for system and security practitioners around the major challenges in understanding, designing, and implementing plausible deniability into new or existing systems.

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“…However, the deployment of a PD system already raises suspicion about the existence of sensitive data. A similar issue also exists for deniable encryption [7,6].…”

Section: Invisible Pdmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…The scheme Σ is said to achieve single-snapshot PD if the winning probability of  is ≤ 1 2 + ( ), where ( ) is a negligible function on the security parameter . 6 This game extends to capture multi-snapshot security by allowing  to access the device state at the end of each round.…”

Section: Adversary Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

SoK: Plausibly Deniable Storage

Chen¹,

Liang²,

Cărbunar³

et al. 2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This game is played between a coercive adversary  and a challenger  running a PD scheme Σ.  only knows (for the public data that the scheme is not trying to hide), but not 6 .…”

Section: Unified Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

SoK: Plausibly Deniable Storage

Chen

Liang

Cărbunar³

et al. 2022

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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Data privacy is critical in instilling trust and empowering the societal pacts of modern technology-driven democracies. Unfortunately it is under continuous attack by overreaching or outright oppressive governments, including some of the world’s oldest democracies. Increasingly-intrusive anti-encryption laws severely limit the ability of standard encryption to protect privacy. New defense mechanisms are needed. Plausible deniability (PD) is a powerful property, enabling users to hide the existence of sensitive information in a system under direct inspection by adversaries. Popular encrypted storage systems such as TrueCrypt and other research efforts have attempted to also provide plausible deniability. Unfortunately, these efforts have often operated under less well-defined assumptions and adversarial models. Careful analyses often uncover not only high overheads but also outright security compromise. Further, our understanding of adversaries, the underlying storage technologies, as well as the available plausible deniable solutions have evolved dramatically in the past two decades. The main goal of this work is to systematize this knowledge. It aims to: (1) identify key PD properties, requirements and approaches; (2) present a direly-needed unified framework for evaluating security and performance; (3) explore the challenges arising from the critical interplay between PD and modern system layered stacks; (4) propose a new “trace-oriented” PD paradigm, able to decouple security guarantees from the underlying systems and thus ensure a higher level of flexibility and security independent of the technology stack. This work is meant also as a trusted guide for system and security practitioners around the major challenges in understanding, designing and implementing plausible deniability into new or existing systems.

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“…• Multiparty non-interactive key exchange in the plain model (without trusted setup), e.g., [34,95]. [111], and fully deniable interactive encryption [51]. • Constant round concurrent zero-knowledge protocols for any NP language [57].…”

Section: Implications Of 𝑖Omentioning

confidence: 99%

Indistinguishability obfuscation from well-founded assumptions

Jain

Lin

Sahai

2021

Proceedings of the 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing

164

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Indistinguishability obfuscation, introduced by [Barak et. al. Crypto 2001], aims to compile programs into unintelligible ones while preserving functionality. It is a fascinating and powerful object that has been shown to enable a host of new cryptographic goals and beyond. However, constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation have remained elusive, with all other proposals relying on heuristics or newly conjectured hardness assumptions.In this work, we show how to construct indistinguishability obfuscation from subexponential hardness of four well-founded assumptions. We prove: Informal Theorem: Let 𝜏 ∈ (0, ∞), 𝛿 ∈ (0, 1), 𝜖 ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary constants. Assume sub-exponential security of the following assumptions:-the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption with subexponential modulus-to-noise ratio 2 𝑘 𝜖 and noises of magnitude polynomial in 𝑘, where 𝑘 is the dimension of the LWE secret, -the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption over general prime fields Z 𝑝 with polynomially many LPN samples and error rate 1/ℓ 𝛿 , where ℓ is the dimension of the LPN secret, -the existence of a Boolean Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG) in NC 0 with stretch 𝑛 1+𝜏 , where 𝑛 is the length of the PRG seed, -the Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption on symmetric bilinear groups of prime order. Then, (subexponentially secure) indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits exists. Further, assuming only polynomial security of the aforementioned assumptions, there exists collusion resistant public-key functional encryption for all polynomial-size circuits. CCS CONCEPTS• Theory of computation → Cryptographic primitives.

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Fully Deniable Interactive Encryption

Cited by 19 publications

References 16 publications

SoK: Plausibly Deniable Storage

SoK: Plausibly Deniable Storage

SoK: Plausibly Deniable Storage

Indistinguishability obfuscation from well-founded assumptions

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