Fully Distrustful Quantum Bit Commitment and Coin Flipping

Silman, Jonathan; Chailloux, André; Aharon, Nati; Kerenidis, Iordanis; Pironio, Stefano; Massar, Serge

doi:10.1103/physrevlett.106.220501

Cited by 45 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…During the preparation of this work, other groups have shown that our protocol can be modified to reduce the bias slightly2324. Alternatively, a device-independent and loss-tolerant protocol, having a bias lower than our protocol, was recently proposed25. Whether a loss-tolerant protocol can asymptotically reach the optimal bound for strong coin flipping9 is still an open question.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Experimental loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping

et al. 2011

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Coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive in which two distrustful parties wish to generate a random bit to choose between two alternatives. This task is impossible to realize when it relies solely on the asynchronous exchange of classical bits: one dishonest player has complete control over the final outcome. It is only when coin flipping is supplemented with quantum communication that this problem can be alleviated, although partial bias remains. Unfortunately, practical systems are subject to loss of quantum data, which allows a cheater to force a bias that is complete or arbitrarily close to complete in all previous protocols and implementations. Here we report on the first experimental demonstration of a quantum coin-flipping protocol for which loss cannot be exploited to cheat better. By eliminating the problem of loss, which is unavoidable in any realistic setting, quantum coin flipping takes a significant step towards real-world applications of quantum communication.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We note that, in principle, this assumption could be relaxed by using a device-independent quantum coin flipping protocol such as the one proposed recently in ref. 25.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping

et al. 2011

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“…Assuming that the devices carry at least some memory of past interactions is an extremely realistic assumption due to technical limitations, even if Alice and Bob prepare their own trusted, but imperfect, devices, highlighting the extreme importance of such analyses for the implementation of device independent QKD. In contrast, relatively little is known about device independence outside the realm of QKD [12][13][14][15].Conference key agreement [16,17] (CKA or N-CKA) is the task of distributing a secret key among N parties. In order to achieve this goal, one could make use of N −1 individual QKD protocols to distribute N − 1 different keys between one of the parties (Alice) and the others (Bob 1 , .…”

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confidence: 99%

Fully device-independent conference key agreement

2018

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We present the first security analysis of conference key agreement (CKA) in the most adversarial model of device independence (DI). Our protocol can be implemented by any experimental setup that is capable of performing Bell tests (specifically, the Mermin-Ardehali-Belinskii-Klyshko (MABK) inequality), and security can in principle be obtained for any violation of the MABK inequality that detects genuine multipartite entanglement among the N parties involved in the protocol. As our main tool, we derive a direct physical connection between the N -partite MABK inequality and the CHSH inequality, showing that certain violations of the MABK inequality correspond to a violation of the CHSH inequality between one of the parties and the other N − 1. We compare the asymptotic key rate for DICKA to the case where the parties use N − 1 DIQKD protocols in order to generate a common key. We show that for some regime of noise the DICKA protocol leads to better rates.Quantum communication allows cryptographic security that is provably impossible to obtain using any classical means. Probably the most famous example of a quantum advantage is quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2], which allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to exchange an encryption key whose security is guaranteed even if the adversary has an arbitrarily powerful quantum computer. What's more, properties of entanglement lead to the remarkable feature that security is sometimes possible even if the quantum devices used to execute the protocol are largely untrusted. Specifically, the notion of device independent (DI) security [3-5] models quantum devices as black boxes in which we may only choose measurement settings and observe measurement outcomes. Yet, the quantum state and measurements employed by such boxes are unknown, and may even be prepared arbitrarily by the adversary.Significant efforts have been undertaken to establish the security of device independent QKD [5][6][7][8][9][10][11], leading to ever more sophisticated security proofs. Initial proofs assumed a simple model in which the devices act independently and identically (i.i.d.) in each round of the protocol. This significantly simplifies the security analysis since the underlying properties of the devices may first be estimated by gaining statistical confidence from the observation of the measurement outcomes in the tested rounds. The main challenge overcome by the more recent security proofs [8][9][10][11] was to establish security even if the devices behave arbitrarily from one round to the next, including having an arbitrary memory of the past that they might use to thwart the efforts of Alice and Bob. Assuming that the devices carry at least some memory of past interactions is an extremely realistic assumption due to technical limitations, even if Alice and Bob prepare their own trusted, but imperfect, devices, highlighting the extreme importance of such analyses for the implementation of device independent QKD. In contrast, relatively little is known about device independence outside the realm ...

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“…uses only the properties of quantum information, an increasingly long list of applications illustrate the added cryptographic power of the relativistic no-signalling principle, either alone (e.g 78910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637…”

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confidence: 99%

Secure and Robust Transmission and Verification of Unknown Quantum States in Minkowski Space

Kent

Massar

Silman

2014

Sci Rep

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An important class of cryptographic applications of relativistic quantum information work as follows. B generates a random qudit and supplies it to A at point P. A is supposed to transmit it at near light speed c to to one of a number of possible pairwise spacelike separated points Q1, …, Qn. A's transmission is supposed to be secure, in the sense that B cannot tell in advance which Qj will be chosen. This poses significant practical challenges, since secure reliable long-range transmission of quantum data at speeds near to c is presently not easy. Here we propose different techniques to overcome these diffculties. We introduce protocols that allow secure long-range implementations even when both parties control only widely separated laboratories of small size. In particular we introduce a protocol in which A needs send the qudit only over a short distance, and securely transmits classical information (for instance using a one time pad) over the remaining distance. We further show that by using parallel implementations of the protocols security can be maintained in the presence of moderate amounts of losses and errors.

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Fully Distrustful Quantum Bit Commitment and Coin Flipping

Cited by 45 publications

References 25 publications

Experimental loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping

Experimental loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping

Fully device-independent conference key agreement

Secure and Robust Transmission and Verification of Unknown Quantum States in Minkowski Space

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