Fully Secure Lightweight Certificateless Signature Scheme for IIoT

Abstract

In recent years, Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has become increasingly important for applications in the industry. Inevitably, security for IIoT has become a priority in order to deploy secure applications. Amongst available cryptographic tools, certificateless signature schemes offer sound authentication solutions and avoid public-key certification from Trusted Third Parties (TTP). Certificateless signatures solve the key escrow problem against the dishonest Private Key Generator (PKG) and has considered to be a useful tool for IIoT applications. Recently, Karati et al. (IEEE Trans. Industrial Informatics, vol.14, no. 8, 2018) presented a lightweight certificateless signature scheme for IIoT Environments. This scheme was then broken by Zhang et al. (IEEE Access, vol. 8, 2018) by simply allowing to change the public key of the signer and using the homomorphic property of the original scheme. In this paper, we introduce a new attack to the scheme against the existential unforgeability, which is universal since we do not have to assume homomorphic property. We then introduce an entirely new lightweight certificateless signature scheme, which has been proven to be fully secure against all attacks found earlier. Our scheme is the first lightweight certificateless signature scheme with full security and is the most efficient in comparison with other existing schemes. It is desirable for IIoT applications. We also provide experimental results to justify our claims.

A Novel Efficient Certificateless Signature Scheme for the Prevention of Content Poisoning Attack in Named Data Networking-Based Internet of Things

“…However, the security complexity of the proposed scheme was based on the concept of elliptic curve cryptography. Later in 2019, Rezaeibagha et al [49], also improved the given scheme of Karati et al [46] by tossing a new scheme for the IIoT domain. However, the security complexity of the proposed scheme was based on the concept of bilinear pairing.…”

“…To assess the impact, the given scheme was compared with seven relevant schemes proposed by Yeh et al [45], Karati et al [46], Zhang et al [47], Sajid et al [37], Nasrollah and Vanda [48], Rezaeibagha et al [49] and Thumbur et al [50]. The key points from our comparison are explained in Table 4.…”

“…Also, the signature verifier, which require two ℳ ℋ to authenticate the signature . Based on [45][46][47][48][49][50], [37], Table 4, shows the computational cost required by the previously proposed cryptographic schemes with respect to costly mathematical operations used. Table 5, Shows the performance comparisons between the designed scheme and the previously related schemes in milliseconds.…”

Security Vulnerabilities of Four Signature Schemes From NTRU Lattices and Pairings

“…Rezaeibagha et al [11] proposed a new lightweight CLS scheme for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). They proved its unforgeability for the Type I and II adversities under the hardness assumption of the q-BSDH problem.…”

“…They showed that their scheme was existential unforgeable for Type I, Type II and Type III adversaries under the intractability of the SIS problem. Recently, Wang et al [17] proposed a certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) scheme from bilinear pairings and Rezaeibagha et al [11] proposed a new lightweight CLS scheme for Industrial Internet of Things from bilinear pairings. The security of their schemes was proven for Type I and Type II adversaries under the intractability of some mathematical problems.…”