Fundamental dimensions of U.S. trade policy

Bohara, Alok K.; Camargo, Alejandro; Grijalva, Therese; Gawande, Kishore

doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2003.10.002

Journal of International Economics

2005

DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2003.10.002

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Fundamental dimensions of U.S. trade policy

Alok K. Bohara

Alejandro Camargo

Therese Grijalva

et al.

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Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“… 1 Schattschneider 1935; and Baldwin 1985 have spawned an enormous political economy literature. They are substantiated using voting data in Hiscox 2002; Bohara et al 2005; Baldwin and Magee 2000; and McGillivray 1997.…”

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confidence: 87%

What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade

Gawande¹,

Krishna²,

Olarreaga³

2009

Int Org

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Policymaking power enables governments to redistribute income to powerful interests in society+ However, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others+ This government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political, and institutional factors+ Trade policy, being fundamentally redistributive, provides a valuable context in which the welfare-mindedness of governments may be empirically evaluated+ This article investigates quantitatively the welfare-mindedness of governments and attempts to understand these political and institutional determinants of the differences in government behavior across countries+ Although all governments are endowed with policymaking powers to redistribute income to powerful interests in society, some governments exhibit greater concern for aggregate welfare than others+ Government behavior may itself be endogenously determined by a number of economic, political, and institutional factors+ For instance, in the presence of a weak system of checks and balances or a low level of political competition, it may be easier for governments to redistribute resources toward those special interests they favor+ It is the goal of this article to study quantitatively the relative welfare-mindedness of governments in a large sample of countries and to try and understand the differences in government behavior across countries using economic, political, and institutional factors+We proceed in two steps+ The first step is to quantify the extent to which governments are concerned with aggregate welfare relative to any other private interests+ This requires data in which the redistributive powers of governments are inherent, and which reflect the particular tradeoff between aggregate and private interest+ In our analysis, we use trade policy determination as the context in which Financial support from the World Bank's DECRS grant is acknowledged+ The views are entirely those of the authors and not the World Bank's+ We are grateful to the editors and two anonymous referees for their insightful comments, which improved the paper considerably+ We thank seminar participants at the

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mentioning

confidence: 87%

What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade

Gawande¹,

Krishna²,

Olarreaga³

2009

Int Org

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Does Economic Education Make a Difference in Congress? How Economics Majors Vote on Trade

O’Roark

2012

The Journal of Economic Education

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Preference Changes in New Liberalism: The Impact of Changes of Government on US Trade Negotiations with South Korea and Colombia

Janusch

2018

Int. Negot.

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In classical two-level games, international cooperation is less likely when there is large programmatic distance and smaller domestic win-sets as a result of changing preferences. The US trade negotiations with South Korea and Colombia question this hypothesis and emphasize two empirical insights that can be integrated into the two-level game to improve its explanatory power. First, smaller win-sets due to preference changes can mitigate conflicts of distribution and make cooperation more likely if the negotiators are aware of the smaller win-sets. Second, when negotiators perceive the already achieved bargaining results as a new status quo, former positive sum games can transform into zero sum games, which makes cooperation more difficult, irrespective of the size of the win-sets. Negotiators who perceive conflicts as zero sum games will put more effort into avoiding losses and, as a result, domestic constraints cannot be used as bargaining levers vis-à-vis a foreign country.

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Fundamental dimensions of U.S. trade policy

Cited by 4 publications

References 29 publications

What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade

What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade

Does Economic Education Make a Difference in Congress? How Economics Majors Vote on Trade

Preference Changes in New Liberalism: The Impact of Changes of Government on US Trade Negotiations with South Korea and Colombia

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