Fundamental Theory for Evolutionary Games

Tanimoto, Jun

doi:10.1007/978-4-431-54962-8_2

Cited by 27 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 36 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Note that the GID is inspired by an ambitious intention to exploit others more seriously, while the RAD is caused by the fear of being exploited by others. In other words, the GID is an indicator of the intention of exploitation, while the RAD is an indicator of the avoidance of exploitation [ 9 ]. Therefore, the relaxation of the GID is more critical to the development of cooperative behaviour.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, we often observe cooperative behaviour in human and animal societies, even though society is constructed by non-kin agents [ 2 , 3 ]. Game theory has been extensively studied to explain how cooperation is promoted in human and animal societies [ 4 – 9 ]. One of the main foci of studies in game theory is the kind of reciprocity mechanisms that can resolve social dilemmas that disturb the promotion and evolution of cooperative behaviour and how the reciprocity mechanisms can allow players to escape from dilemmas [ 9 – 11 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Game theory has been extensively studied to explain how cooperation is promoted in human and animal societies [ 4 – 9 ]. One of the main foci of studies in game theory is the kind of reciprocity mechanisms that can resolve social dilemmas that disturb the promotion and evolution of cooperative behaviour and how the reciprocity mechanisms can allow players to escape from dilemmas [ 9 – 11 ]. In game theory, many 2 × 2 (pairwise) dilemma games have been built to investigate the types of reciprocity mechanisms that enable a player to overcome conflicts of interests and promote cooperative behaviour [ 10 , 11 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a pairwise game, there are two indicators with which to measure the strength of the dilemma situation. One is the gamble-intending dilemma (GID), which appears because players try to exploit their opponents, and the other is the risk-averting dilemma (RAD), which appears because players try not to be exploited by their opponents [ 9 , 12 – 14 ]. The strengths of these two dilemmas, namely, the GID and RAD, can be calculated from the elements of the pay-off matrix (equation (1.1)) [ 14 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nowak's five reciprocity rules (i.e. direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection and network reciprocity) work as reciprocity mechanisms to resolve (relax) social dilemmas and promote cooperative behaviour [ 9 , 14 , 16 ]. These fundamental mechanisms are collectively known as social viscosity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation

Ito

Tanimoto

2020

R. Soc. open sci.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Game theory has been extensively applied to elucidate the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behaviour. Dilemmas in game theory are important elements that disturb the promotion of cooperation. An important question is how to escape from dilemmas. Recently, a dynamic utility function (DUF) that considers an individual's current status (wealth) and that can be applied to game theory was developed. The DUF is different from the famous five reciprocity mechanisms called Nowak's five rules. Under the DUF, cooperation is promoted by poor players in the chicken game, with no changes in the prisoner's dilemma and stag-hunt games. In this paper, by comparing the strengths of the two dilemmas, we show that the DUF is a novel reciprocity mechanism (sixth rule) that differs from Nowak's five rules. We also show the difference in dilemma relaxation between dynamic game theory and (traditional) static game theory when the DUF and one of the five rules are combined. Our results indicate that poor players unequivocally promote cooperation in any dynamic game. Unlike conventional rules that have to be brought into game settings, this sixth rule is universally (canonical form) applicable to any game because all repeated/evolutionary games are dynamic in principle.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation

Ito

Tanimoto

2020

R. Soc. open sci.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Behavioral game of quarantine during the monkeypox epidemic: Analysis of deterministic and fractional order approach

Ullah,

Kabir

2024

Heliyon

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Social efficiency deficit deciphers social dilemmas

Arefin

Kabir

Jusup

et al. 2020

Sci Rep

Self Cite

107

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What do corruption, resource overexploitation, climate inaction, vaccine hesitancy, traffic congestion, and even cancer metastasis have in common? All these socioeconomic and sociobiological phenomena are known as social dilemmas because they embody in one form or another a fundamental conflict between immediate self-interest and long-term collective interest. A shortcut to the resolution of social dilemmas has thus far been reserved solely for highly stylised cases reducible to dyadic games (e.g., the Prisoner’s Dilemma), whose nature and outcome coalesce in the concept of dilemma strength. We show that a social efficiency deficit, measuring an actor’s potential gain in utility or fitness by switching from an evolutionary equilibrium to a social optimum, generalises dilemma strength irrespective of the underlying social dilemma’s complexity. We progressively build from the simplicity of dyadic games for which the social efficiency deficit and dilemma strength are mathematical duals, to the complexity of carcinogenesis and a vaccination dilemma for which only the social efficiency deficit is numerically calculable. The results send a clear message to policymakers to enact measures that increase the social efficiency deficit until the strain between what is and what could be incentivises society to switch to a more desirable state.

show abstract

Fundamental Theory for Evolutionary Games

Cited by 27 publications

References 36 publications

Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation

Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation

Behavioral game of quarantine during the monkeypox epidemic: Analysis of deterministic and fractional order approach

Social efficiency deficit deciphers social dilemmas

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About